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Abstract
Health monitoring systems have demonstrated the ability to detect potential
failures in components and predict how long until a critical failure is likely to occur. The
decision to implement these systems on fielded structures, aircraft, or other vehicles is
often a struggle due to the difficulty of demonstrating to prove cost savings or operational
improvements beyond improved safety. A system architecture to identify how the health
monitoring systems are integrated into fielded aircraft is developed to assess cost,
operations, maintenance, and logistics trade-spaces. The efficiency of a health monitoring
system is examined for impacts to the operation of a squadron of cargo aircraft revealing
sensitivity to, and tolerance for, false alarms as a key factor in total system performance.
The research focuses on the impacts of system-wide changes to several key metrics:
materiel availability, materiel reliability, ownership cost, and mean downtime. Changes
to these system-wide variables include: diagnostic and prognostic error, false alarm
sensitivity, supply methods and timing, maintenance manning, and maintenance repair
window. Potential cost savings in maintenance and logistics processes are identified as
well as increases in operational availability. The result of this research is the development
of a tool to conduct trade-space analyses regarding the effects of health monitoring
techniques on system performance and operations and maintenance costs.
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INTEGRATED SYSTEMS HEALTH MANAGEMENT AS AN ENABLER FOR
CONDITION BASED MAINTENANCE AND AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS

I. Introduction
The state of health for major infrastructure and transportation systems nationally
and globally is deteriorating. Aircraft, in particular, are an example where lengthening
service lives and budget constraints can affect the safety of the vehicle and the occupants.
Currently, more frequent inspections are required as service life increases to ensure safety
of the users and the environment. The I-35W Mississippi River bridge collapse in
Minneapolis in 2007, for instance, resulted in loss of life and drove a massive inspection
cycle for United States highway infrastructure (Modares & Waksmanski, 2012).
Maintenance strategies must change to meet the extended in-service requirements and the
constraints imposed by shrinking government and industry budgets.
Across many industries, systems are exceeding their intended design lives,
whether they are ships, bridges or US Air Force aircraft. Structural health monitoring
(SHM) research and application has the potential to lengthen the service life of a range of
systems and, in some cases, predict failure modes and times. As such, funding and
research are focused on researching new technologies and applications. However, the
cost of large scale implementation in the case of hundreds of aircraft or approximately
70000 “structurally deficient” highway bridges is a significant hurdle to overcome in
most instances (Shoup, Donohue, & Lang, 2011). The impact of shrinking budgets can
also reduce inspection frequency or delay needed repairs in favor of only performing
1

mission critical tasks (Roach, 2009). Condition based maintenance (CBM) is an evolving
maintenance concept with a goal of reducing maintenance and thus life cycle costs while
increasing operational availability. It is made possible, in part, by leveraging health
monitoring techniques. Integrated system health management (ISHM) incorporates health
monitoring functions across a platform to provide system-wide state of health diagnostics
and prognostics. The impact of ISHM and CBM on performance, cost, and supply chain
as well as traditional maintenance inspections and practices is the focus of this research.
With the F-35 maintenance and logistics alone projected to cost $1.1 trillion over
the 55-year life span amid shrinking defense budgets, the need to reduce the life cycle
cost (LCC) of military aircraft is paramount (Shalal-Esa, 2013). Legacy aircraft may not
be fitted with the proper sensors to fully implement health assessment leading to costly
inspections, in both time and maintenance dollars. The inspections result in reduced
operational availability (AO) and budget available for other needs. Figure 1 depicts the
operational concept of a condition based maintenance system enabled through integrated
systems health management.
One method for improving operational availability through the implementation of
integrated health monitoring is by using data collected to forecast and group maintenance
tasks to reduce total downtime. This reduction can be realized through the elimination of
multiple set-up, tear-down, and reassembly cycles in favor of a single cycle with
numerous maintenance actions accomplished during that downtime. Further efficiencies
may be realized through the scheduling of maintenance personnel based on knowing
when and what repairs are required prior to beginning any maintenance activity.
2

Figure 1. ISHM/CBM Operational Concept
Mean downtime (MDT) is a measure of the efficiency of maintenance and
logistics processes. MDT is the total time from when the element of a system is taken out
of service until it is again declared fully mission capable, as opposed to mean time to
repair which is the hands-on maintenance repair portion. The DoD predicts that by
implementing CBM MDT will be “significantly reduced” by performing demand versus
time-driven maintenance (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008). Research by
Derriso (2013), however, shows the MDT may actually increase as the system will only
be taken down for maintenance rather than additional time-based inspections, which are
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often short in duration. He also observes that total downtime is reduced for the ISHM
versus the baseline time-based case.
What is missing from the mean and total downtime measures is the value of those
times. Is the time being spent troubleshooting symptoms, locating a fault, or waiting on
parts, as in the baseline case? If the time is spent only on repair of the system because the
ISHM/CBM system predicted and isolated the failure as well as ordered parts to meet the
demand, that time can be thought of has having more quality behind it. This downtime
quality reflects added benefit provided by the ISHM/CBM system.

Problem Statement
While health monitoring techniques continue to evolve, the capability to study
their cost and availability impacts across flight, maintenance, and logistics realms
remains a difficult task.

Research Objective
Even with a policy that requires its implementation, CBM has to “buy its way”
into the program. Service leadership and the program and support managers
want to do the right thing for the warfighter, but a return on the investment must
be identified and justified. In the long run, any Service effort to develop and
deploy CBM should be leveraged by other platforms and programs (Under
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008, p. 1-7).
This research seeks to determine the design and implementation processes to
thoroughly integrate ISHM, CBM and logistics systems to define operational and cost
trade-spaces for multiple systems with multiple subcomponents in each system.

4

These examinations require a comprehensive model that explores the
interconnections between multiple systems each having numerous components that can
provide greater detail on the impacts of changes in one area propagating throughout the
remainder of the model. This research focuses on the potential benefits to AO and
operations and maintenance (O&M) cost through the use of ISHM systems to enable
CBM. This in-turn provides a detailed examination of trade-offs available to the user.
Providing a means to explore AO and cost impact with the opportunity to improve both
and reduce manpower requirements is of great interest to program managers, system
operators, and financial planners

Investigative Questions
The questions posed in this dissertation include the following:
1. What are the key cost and effectiveness drivers for an ISHM enabled CBM
and autonomic logistics process?
2. What is a reasonable and appropriate scope for model development to
establish performance requirements for ISHM sensors and prognostics,
maintenance, and logistic processes?
3. What are the operations and maintenance cost impacts of an ISHM enabled
CBM system?
4. Is mean downtime a good measure of system performance for ISHM/CBM
systems?
5. Does maintenance grouping based on prognostics improve operational
availability, total downtime and cost?
Methodology Overview
The approach taken in this research builds upon prior work on health monitoring,
condition based maintenance and logistics. An Arena® model is developed incorporating
5

systems architecture principles to analyze cost and availability impacts of proposed
concepts of operation. A baseline (current) case is compared to the same aircraft with a
health monitoring system implemented. Analysis of support levels, both maintenance and
supply, are examined in conjunction with health monitoring techniques.
The first step in creating the model is to determine both the baseline and
ISHM/CBM designs, which are found in system architectures presented in chapters 3 and
4. The inputs required and relevant for each process are identified from this architecture.
Defining the reliability and maintainability of the system is next with collection and
utilization methods discussed later. Next, the processes are modeled and output
parameters required for the measures of effectiveness and measures of performance are
evaluated. The model captures accumulated effects on system performance and aircraft
life. These outputs are then analyzed to determine the impacts of ISHM/CBM on the
system as a whole.
A baseline model, reflecting current maintenance and supply policies and
capabilities is the first step for validation of model performance and to provide a starting
point for system performance. Building upon the baseline “as-is” model, the inclusion of
health monitoring and prognostics augments or replaces current maintenance inspection
and preventive replacement procedures. Utilizing the prognostic capabilities of the health
monitoring system, information about impending failures and system requirements is fed
into the supply system to attempt to match the aircraft need with logistics capabilities.
Based upon logistics, maintenance, and operational requirements, a time frame to
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maintain the aircraft is projected to balance these requirements with the goal of keeping
operational availability high and cost low.
The aircraft under study in this research is the C-17 Globemaster III. These
aircraft are currently fully fielded in the USAF inventory and they are planned to be in
the fleet for a long duration. The C-17 employs CBM techniques to an extent, with
limited built in test capabilities and diagnostics (Smith, 2003). While particular aircraft
subsystems represented in the model are simulated, they do not represent actual aircraft
systems. Therefore, this model can also be readily applied more broadly to USAF cargo
aircraft not just the C-17. Mission profiles and preflight activities utilized are
representative of transport aircraft operations and yearly flying hours are comparable to
the C-17. This model will process a squadron of 12 aircraft through current operational
activities and compare those results to the same squadron with heath monitoring,
condition based maintenance and a supply system interwoven with these advanced
techniques.

Assumptions/Limitations
Assumptions in this research are done in an effort to limit the scope and
complexity of model. While further assumptions are contained in chapters 3-7, those
relevant to the entire work are:


A squadron of 12 aircraft is used for modeling and analysis;



All components of interest have monitoring sensors;



All components are non-repairable, that is, replaced versus repaired when
required;
7



Performance impact to the aircraft from weight and power requirements of the
ISHM system and sensors is negligible;



One subsystem comprised of 20 unique components is modeled;



Inflation is not considered;



Military deployments are ignored;



Personnel are devoted to the aircraft in the model;



Only direct maintenance actions required for the components under study are
recorded.
Limitations of this work lie in that capturing costs savings may not be directly

possible for military systems due to deployments, allocation of personnel across multiple
systems and the mix of uniformed and contractor personnel

Implications
This research model has the potential to not only reduce aircraft O&M costs, but
also to improve availability and reduce maintenance manning and/or workload. This
work allows for the visualization of system processes and the impact of health monitoring
techniques on overall performance. Further, the methods and techniques used herein are
applicable to other vehicle types and systems.
A key impact of this work is the ability to analyze the effects of new health
monitoring techniques by inputting them into the model and studying the performance
outcomes. Alternatively, if a desired aircraft or logistics performance level is established,
a trade study can be performed to determine health monitoring or prognostics
requirements necessary to meet those demands. In general, this research provides for the
analysis of ISHM enabled CBM and supply strategies for military system with emphasis
on cost and availability impacts.
8

This work demonstrates that it is possible, based on a limited set of components,
for significant savings to be realized in the maintenance and logistics direct costs and
through a reduction in required personnel. Additionally, increased availability of aircraft
allows for fewer aircraft to do the same mission.

Preview
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of literature
relevant to this research and identifies gaps that this work studies. Chapter 3 establishes a
system architecture and measures of effectiveness for model evaluation. Chapters 4
through 6 are drawn from manuscripts published, in review, or to be submitted. Chapter
4, titled “Prognostic Uncertainty,” addresses investigative questions #1 and #2 identified
above. This chapter has been published in The International Journal of Prognostics and
Health Management with the article titled Impact of Prognostic Uncertainty in System
Health Monitoring. Chapter 5, titled “Component Supply Methods,” explores the effect
of a health monitoring system on supply methodologies and addresses questions #1, #2
and #3 identified above. This chapter is drawn from a manuscript titled Health
Monitoring Impact on Non-Repairable Component Supply Methods that will be submitted
to Decision Sciences. Chapter 6, titled “Maintenance Manning Processes,” addresses
research questions #1 through #4. The text is from a manuscript titled An Examination of
System Health Monitoring Impact on Non-Repairable Component Maintenance Manning
that will be submitted to the Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering. Chapter 7
examines investigative questions #4 and #5 with an exploration of the grouping of
9

component replacements. Finally, chapter 8 provides overall research conclusions and
recommendations.
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II. Literature Review

Chapter Overview
This chapter provides background information on key concepts and techniques
within the health monitoring, maintenance and supply realms. These topics are addressed
in this chapter in an effort to identify gaps in current research. Within each of the realms,
technologies and policies that enable condition based maintenance are discussed with a
focus on cost and system availability. The topics covered herein form the foundation for
the development of an architecture for analyzing the effects of ISHM on CBM and the
supply chain. Additionally, chapters 4-7 contain background and motivation specific to
the topics covered therein.

Health Monitoring Concepts
Structural health monitoring (SHM), while sometimes applied as monitoring for a
system at large, is a set of techniques used either individually or in conjunction with
others to determine the status of structural components of a vehicle or system. SHM
systems use a variety of techniques to detect the onset or growth of damage, i.e., cracks
or delaminations, prior to failure. Other health monitoring sensing systems exist to
monitor electrical or electronic systems as well as rotating machinery (aircraft engines) or
hydraulic systems. A good review of SHM technology and application is found in
(Glaser, Li, Wang, Ou, & Lynch, 2007). Integrated vehicle health management (IVHM)
and integrated systems health management (ISHM), used interchangeably in published
11

works, seek to compile the various SHM and other sensor networks and interpret the
health of the vehicle or system as a whole. This processing can be done on or off-board
the system in question depending on system intent and requirements.
Prognostics and health management (PHM) is synonymous with IVHM and
ISHM in most literature, emphasizing the prognostics capability to determine the
remaining useful life (RUL) of a component. RUL is then used to aid in the determination
of when and how to maintain the system. Examining the RUL of individual components
or subsystems can assist in maintenance planning and in supply requisitions, transitioning
from time-based replacement to repair or replacement based on actual material condition.
The use of RUL information for mission planning, maintenance optimization and supply
chain management is often referred to as autonomic logistics (AL) as the ISHM system
performs these functions with little or no human interaction. Progressing from the
component level sensing systems through the compilation of their data and forecasting of
impending failure enables the transformation in maintenance concepts. Hess (2005)
decomposes prognostics and health management (PHM) with three terms:


Enhanced Diagnostics: the process of determining the state of a component
to perform its function(s), high degree of fault detection and fault isolation
capability with very low false alarm rate;



Prognostics: actual material condition assessment which includes predicting
and determining the useful life and performance life remaining of components
by modeling fault progression.



Health Management: the capability to make intelligent, informed,
appropriate decisions about maintenance and logistics actions based on
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diagnostics/prognostics information, available resources and operational
demand. (p. 3)
These three terms, while broad, form the foundation for measuring the
effectiveness of an ISHM/CBM system. Enhanced diagnostics encompasses probability
of detection as well as false alarms, directly impacting how often the aircraft must be
taken out of service for inspection and/or repair. Prognostics are the ability of the system
to forecast the remaining useful life of the aircraft, safety of flight and prediction of
impending failures. Health management takes the data from the previous two and
determines when to order spares and when to perform maintenance.

Maintenance Concepts
Maintenance has evolved over time from a “fix it when it breaks” policy to the
current focus on condition based maintenance programs. Table 1 presents a categorical
breakdown of maintenance approaches and their attributes. Rising costs, longer service
lives and reduced manpower have driven a proactive approach to maintaining systems.
The reactive or corrective maintenance approach forces either a costly spares stockpile to
prepare for all possible failures or waiting for replacement parts to arrive resulting in
lower operational availability (Amari, McLaughlin, & Pham, 2006). One of the first
advancements in maintenance practice was to establish regular inspection and preventive
maintenance (PM) intervals. These time-based techniques analyze failure data, either
anecdotal or service history, to determine appropriate timelines to inspect and replace
components or systems (Walls, Thomas, & Brady, 1999). This PM approach results in
reduced catastrophic failures and more predicted maintenance cycles (Deputy Under
13

Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May, 2008). Unanticipated
failures still occur outside the preprogrammed maintenance windows and must be taken
into account.
Additionally, PM subjects the system to unnecessary “repair” based on the
required schedule for the system. The unneeded repair adds extra expense to the system
since the component had remaining useful life, and it increases the probability of damage
resulting from the maintenance action. The diagnostic CBM approach is based on
inspections, visual, automatic, non-destructive, and the like, and parts are then repaired or
replaced as required. The prognostic CBM approach goes a step further than the
diagnostic approach and takes the data from the inspections and forecasts when repairs or
replacements are required. As Iyoob, Cassady, and Pohl (2006) point out, a majority of
studies related to maintenance practices ignore limited budget, manpower or time
constraints. They present logic for determining maintenance actions when the time
between missions does not provide the opportunity to make all desired repairs.
Condition based maintenance and other predictive maintenance programs have
further evolved from preventive strategies to analyzing system health and forecasting
remaining life. Time-based inspections alone will not detect all failures, especially if the
inspection timing associated with the component is such that a critical defect occurs at an
unanticipated interval. The location of the defect also plays an important role in the
failure detection. If the defect is located in an infrequently inspected or difficult to access
area, a small amount of damage can grow to catastrophic amounts prior to detection. In
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such instances, the appropriate application of SHM technology can potentially save a
system from severe or catastrophic damage.
Table 1. Range of Maintenance Approaches
Maintenance Approaches
Category
SubCategory

When
Scheduled

Why
Scheduled

How
Scheduled

Kind of
Prediction

Proactive

Reactive
Run-to-fail

Preventive

Predictive

Fix when it
breaks

Scheduled maintenance

Condition-based
maintenancediagnostic

Condition-based
maintenanceprognostic

No
scheduled
maintenance

Maintenance based on a
fixed time schedule for
inspect, repair and overhaul

Maintenance
based on current
condition

Maintenance based on
forecast of remaining
equipment life

N/A

Intolerable failure effect
and it is possible to prevent
the failure effect through a
scheduled overhaul or
replacement

Maintenance
scheduled based
on evidence of
need

Maintenance need is
projected as probable
within mission time

Based on the useful life of
the component forecasted
during design and updated
through experience

Continuous
collection of
condition
monitoring data

Forecasting of
remaining equipment
life based on actual
stress loading

None

On- and offsystem, nearreal-time trend
analysis

On- and off-system,
real-time trend
analysis

N/A

None

(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May, 2008)

Why CBM?
Condition based maintenance, when appropriately applied, can reduce the life
cycle cost of a system. The United States Department of Defense has implemented a
program, known as condition based maintenance plus (CBM+), to encourage the
implementation of processes in support of CBM across the DoD. Department of Defense
15

Instruction (DoDI) 4151.22 defines CBM+ as “the application and integration of
appropriate processes, technologies, and knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the
target availability, reliability, and operation and support costs of DoD systems and
components across their life cycle” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008, p.
1-1). CBM is a demand driven maintenance process based on indications of stress or
impending failure of a component or system. Ellis (2008) argues that cost-effective
systems monitoring allows repair actions based on system condition rather than costly
time-based maintenance. The health monitoring system monitors component sensor data
until a predetermined point prior to failure, then triggers maintenance to repair or replace
the part. CBM can also proactively examine other systems in the vehicle or structure as
well and compile this data with projected use to determine the maintenance window that
optimizes downtime, manpower and spares. Additionally, interim, time-based inspections
required under the baseline PM approach are forgone in lieu of continuous analysis of the
aircraft via the ISHM system (Ellis, 2008).

CBM Life Cycle Cost Impacts
The real challenge is to develop valid and measurable metrics for quantifying the
impact of the various prognostic technologies. The first step is to process a
cost/benefit analysis using appropriate modeling tools, for each component and/
or subsystem/system to evaluate the consequences of developing and supporting
each component (Hess, Calvello, Frith, Engel, & Hoitsma, 2006, p. 6).
Published literature shows the cost-saving potential of condition based
maintenance and health monitoring systems across the life cycle:
16



40% for vehicle maintenance (Walls, Thomas, & Brady, 1999)



30% to 50% for fuselage panels (Pattabhiraman, Kim, & Haftka, 2010)



10% electrical components (Scanff et al., 2007)



50-80% for the Boeing 777 (Gorinevsky, Gordon, Beard, Kumar, & Chang,
2005).
The issue in many of these studies is the failure to capture costs outside of a few

components and generally restrictive assumptions. Additionally, most do not address how
the prognostics of ISHM can impact supply timing and costs. Since maintenance can be
forecast to match impending failures, personnel hours can be managed accordingly to
meet demand.
Several authors have researched and proposed methods of considering life cycle
costs (LCC) for systems, and they discuss methods for conducting cost/benefit analyses
on diverse systems to determine the impact of an ISHM system on the O&M cost and
LCC of a system, but fail to include logistics in their analyses. Brand and Boller (2000)
use inspection times, research and development, and labor costs for higher level cost and
time savings to explore inspections on commercial aircraft. Walls, Thomas and Brady
(1999) examine a single critical component of hydraulic servos utilizing a decision tree to
assess probability of failures and MTBF of the components, neglecting sensor inputs.
Lugtigheid, Banjevic, and Jardine (2005) discuss repair or replace decisions with
imperfect repair, but fail to use prognostics to inform their repair decisions, instead
utilizing preventive maintenance approaches. Banks, Reichard, Crow and Nickell (2005)
explore battery systems for armored vehicles using prognostics to calculate savings
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through a return on investment based on replacement decisions. They discuss logistics
inputs, but do not include them in the model.
Amari, McLauchlin, and Pham (2006) research CBM with manual inspections at
predetermined intervals and the effect of use conditions on the wear rate of components,
utilizing a Markov process to study cost savings. Pattabhiraman, Kim and Haftka (2010)
compare manual versus ISHM based inspections utilizing maintenance, manufacturing
and fuel costs for an aircraft. Further Pattabhiraman, et al, discuss a hybrid model of
manual and ISHM inspections on a system. Gyekenyesi (2013) discusses a transitional
approach for legacy systems not previously fitted with health monitoring systems and for
systems with inadequate coverage by using non-destructive inspection (NDI). He further
states that NDI can provide confirmation or added peace of mind for ISHM system
results while the users of health monitoring systems gain trust in the prognostics.
Pattabhiraman et al., (2010) also discuss a hybrid model for critical items which could be
applied in a similar manner as Gyekenyesi. While these methods should produce savings,
they are not addressed in this research.
Wilmering and Ramesh (2005) assessed the impact of ISHM approaches on
overall system ownership costs. They argue for a system engineering approach to assess
and blend requirements with technologies through the life cycle of a system to reduce
cost. A seven step method is used to rank ISHM solutions on the basis of component
criticality, failure modes, sensor technologies and ISHM approach to perform a
cost/benefit analysis. This method is similar to the failure mode, effects, and criticality
analysis (FMECA) outlined by Blanchard and Fabrycky in Systems Engineering and
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Analysis, (2005). The aforementioned process is conducted within The Boeing Company
Ownership Cost Calculator for Aerospace health Management (OCCAM) tool. The
OCCAM tool captures maintenance and logistics processes, both recurring and nonrecurring costs. A key item examined is what happens when a part fails, specifically the
impact on the maintenance and logistics process. Labor rates, material costs, inflation and
discount rates are combined to determine the cost impact of decisions. Two limiting
assumptions in this model are that a fixed spares demand is assumed rather than
component utilization projected by the health management system, and repairs are
perfect. The tool also provides for some maintenance scheduling based in part on LCC;
this neglects the impact on availability of the aircraft which can play a large role.
Modares and Waksmanski (2012) state early detection of faults with health
monitoring can limit repair costs and catastrophic failures. In offshore wind turbines,
SHM tools, maintenance scheduling, and performance of the SHM system determine the
added value of the system of systems (A. Van Horenbeek, Van Ostaeyen, Duflou, &
Pintelon, 2013). Van Horenbeek et al. (2013) lay out a system of equations that includes
as inputs: failure cost; component reliability; maintenance costs; and spare parts costs, to
determine the added value of health monitoring for a system. This system provides a
thorough examination for a single system with multiple subcomponents. It does lack,
however, inventory management and the effects of multiple systems operating
simultaneously.
The cost of the ISHM/CBM system must be accounted for in the LCC evaluation
as well. While the long term O&M costs may be significantly reduced, the upfront cost of
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development and deployment of the systems is not inconsequential. With the
development cost for the F-35’s ALIS system approaching half a billion dollars, the
technology and training costs play a role (Butler, 2013). Degradation of the ISHM/CBM
system must be taken into account as well as degradation in the overall system, in this
case aircraft performance (e.g., increased weight and power requirements).
Not germane to the LCC methods discussed above is a cost benefit analysis and
the translation from private, for profit frameworks, to military applications. Assigning
cost impacts of downtime for a commercial aircraft is different than for a military
aircraft. While maintenance and spare parts costs are counted in both, the cost of not
having the plane in operation is quantifiable, at least on a broad scale, in the commercial
sector. Lost revenue, penalties for occupying gates too long, transferring another aircraft
to accommodate passengers, the cost of refunding or transferring passenger tickets can all
be valued. On the military side, attempting to value downtime and ultimately operational
availability is a much more difficult task. A thorough examination of the system
capabilities, costs and infrastructure paired with the logistics, operating and maintenance
requirements must be accomplished to accurately assess the viability of an ISHM system
to reduce the cost of a CBM program.
By the DoD’s own admission, the accuracy of current LCC figures is a rough
estimate as credible means to measure it are not readily available (Under Secretary of
Defense (AT&L), May 2008). In an attempt to gain a clearer picture of the true cost of a
system, the DoD also proposes a Total Life Cycle Systems Management (TLCSM)
metric of cost per unit of operation as what it calls “the best measure of life-cycle costs,”
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(Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008). Ryan’s assessment of the DoD LCC
cost accuracy echoes those above, “[d]espite the fact that DoD cost estimating practices
have become increasingly sophisticated, the actual program cost estimates that are
produced remain poor, at least when compared to the final, actual costs of the program”
(Ryan, Schubert, Jacques, & Ritschel, 2013, p. 73). Capturing these costs in the
respective baseline and ISHM models will likely also be difficult. Millar (2007) cites that
the market’s “invisible hand” holds back implementation and that systems engineering
has thus far not demonstrated the case for use of ISHM to support system sustainment.
The “invisible hand” referred to includes DoD and USG policies that direct the Air Force
practices in acquisition, maintenance and supply. Additionally, while the goal is to save
the taxpayers money, the DoD does not have the commercial profit requirement and
pressure found in industry.

Maintenance Activity Grouping
The goals of grouping maintenance activities utilizing prognostics are reduction in
cost to maintain and increased operational time. The cost savings in grouping
maintenance activities comes, in general, from a reduction in set-up, tear-down and
reassembly times, yielding a reduction in labor costs for multiple individual repair
actions. Operational availability is increased likewise as the total downtime required for
these repairs or replacements is reduced. The earlier a maintenance action is scheduled,
the more useful life is wasted but, in general, the probability of failure is lower.
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Prognostics, enabled through onboard sensor systems allow the useful life to be
consumed up to a predetermined risk level based on uncertainties in the system.
Camci (2009) utilizes a genetic algorithm approach to optimize maintenance for
the CBM case but does not examine the benefits over a PM system. The approach shows
improvement in the generic cost of optimized maintenance using prognostic versus
prognostics enabled CBM alone. Van Horenbeek and Pintelon (2013a; 2013b) use a
heuristic search algorithm to determine the optimal maintenance time and group with
results showing prognostic maintenance (CBM) superior to standard time-based
maintenance policy. The approaches used by Camci and Van Horenbeek represent most
of the work in this area, but do not address the impact of multiple systems with multiple
components and only seek to optimize for cost with little notion of the impact to system
operational availability.

Remaining Useful Life
Since achieving the theoretical limit of 100% failure avoidance is both
impractical and wasteful, we are forced to accept some level of risk. (Hess et al.,
2006, p. 9)

While the methods and techniques used for remaining useful life (RUL)
calculations are outside the research proposed here, their use is essential for the CBM
maintenance and supply processes. A good summary of RUL techniques is found in (Si,
Wang, Hu, & Zhou, 2011). Risk posture and acceptance established by policy or unique
mission needs help to determine when the CBM system calls for replacement of a given
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component or system. This understanding is necessary because RUL calculations have
inherent uncertainty as they are generally derived based upon probability distributions.
After probability of detection, which is a function of the sensor type and software,
remaining useful life prognostics are the most vital processes performed by the ISHM
portion of the ISHM/CBM system.
RUL inference must take into account the P-F curve in Figure 2 for individual
components, where P is the potential failure or point at which deterioration begins or is
detected. The F is the functional failure or where the part or system actually breaks. The
horizontal lines on the curve correspond to limits that are either functions of the system
or prescribed by policy or directives. System detection limit is a function of the ISHM
system and physical attributes of the aircraft; the point of detection (B) occurs where the
failure curve of the component crosses the detection limit. Notification, a policy driven
component, occurs at point C and begins the CBM supply and maintenance planning
window. For components with safety limits, i.e., those that would cause a catastrophic
loss, point D is where the system would be taken down for maintenance.
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Figure 2. Remaining Useful Life Schematic (Jennions, 2011)
In the case of a time or prediction based “failure” when the part is replaced with
some serviceable life remaining, policy based on observed and physics based estimates of
failures dictates the appropriate time frame. The goal is that the probabilistic estimates of
RUL based on real time monitoring allow increased time to accumulate on parts, thus
increasing the MTBF for the ISHM aircraft and total costs associated with replacement
parts.

Supply Chain Forecasting for ISHM Aided CBM Systems
ISHM systems in the US Air Force are currently limited to the F-22, which
requires manual collection and analysis of sensor data, and test articles on individual
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systems and limited engine monitoring systems on several other platforms. These efforts
are not integrated with the logistics chain to optimize maintenance actions with supply
requirements. While individual systems addressing health monitoring exist in the USAF
inventory, e.g., F-22 and C-17, the future goal of Air Force ISHM/CBM integration, lies
in the F-35. One of the F-35’s keys to success and reduction in O&S costs is the
Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS).
ALIS was designed to be a one-stop system to monitor aircraft systems, predict
system failures, increase maintenance efficiency and streamline the supply stream by
combining the range of systems currently in use for existing Air Force aircraft. The F-16,
which is the standard for legacy aircraft, has separate and distinct systems for supply,
maintenance, and pre and post mission inspections (Butler, 2013). These legacy systems
require multiple career fields and administrative processes that increase the turn time
between aircraft missions. Communication between the aircraft and ground systems by
ALIS allows optimization of down-time and prepositioning of required parts, ensuring
maintenance personnel maximize the availability of the aircraft. An example of
maintenance time savings is the use of electronic tracking of fluid levels versus manual
gauges. Additionally, Butler (2013) states that flight control maintenance on the F-35 is
reduced from 8-14 hours on legacy aircraft to 5 minutes. Further details on this dramatic
reduction are not provided in the article. When maintenance actions across the F-35 are
compounded, the potential for large downtime savings is immense. Whether or not these
savings can be realized is yet to be seen. As the F-35 approaches initial and then full
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operating capability, maintenance and logistics data will be analyzed to determine the
true value of the ALIS system.
Perhaps the key feature of ALIS is the prognostic capability. The prognostics and
health management (PHM) system of the F-35 shifts maintenance policy from preventive
time-driven routines to condition or demand driven actions. The PHM system calculates
the remaining useful life of a system or component which flows into the supply pipeline
to ensure lead times for part orders are met when maintenance is required. The fielding of
ALIS or any similar component or vehicle-wide system on legacy aircraft will require
concept of operations (CONOPs) changes for maintenance and operations. These
changes, while they must be enforced and driven from higher command levels, must
obtain “buy-in” at the squadron level as they are unproven and potentially unreliable.
Byer, Hess, and Fila (Byer, Hess, & Fila, 2001) project that PHM’s automation capability
can eliminate bureaucracy built up in military logistics and supply systems. If operational
change can be affected, streamlining the maintenance, supply and operations activities
proposed in the ALIS system are achievable.
The ALIS system is not without problems though, along with the rest of the F-35
program. With a development cost approaching $448 million, ALIS is not yet proven and
has security flaws (Butler, 2013). Additionally, the system is behind schedule and fails to
meet maintenance and sortie generation requirements for the F-35. “To date, diagnostic
system performance has failed to meet basic functional requirements, including fault
detection, fault isolation, and false alarm rates,” (Director, Operational Test &
Evaluation, 2013, p. 49). In the interim, manual intervention by maintainers, using legacy
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aircraft techniques, and contractor support are used to keep the aircraft flying thus
negating the cost savings that could be afforded by the ALIS system.

Logistics Methods
Supply chain optimization is handled in many ways across industry. Some smaller
businesses manufacture all required parts in house and fix them as needed. This is seldom
the case though and most businesses and industries depend on collaboration with other
agencies.
In the commercial world, profit is the end goal for companies and should be the
selling point for ISHM systems. As Grubic (2009) points out, PHM can shift the
operating paradigm for a system but capturing the impact to potential increases in
revenue is often overlooked aside from the often cited reduction in maintenance costs.
The ability to foresee maintenance issues and optimize when systems are taken offline for
repair is a key part of this revenue generation. Unplanned downtime drives millions of
dollars in cost for organizations with unplanned maintenance costing three to ten times
that of scheduled or predicted maintenance activities (Taft, 2013). This is a key
difference between military and commercial activities in the logistics and maintenance
area. Commercial companies are in business to make a profit, whereas military forces
face no such requirement other than to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars.
In the commercial aerospace field, Boeing is an industry leader in analyzing
logistics requirements for aircraft fleets. Boeing’s Airplane Health Management (AHM)
system takes real-time data from the aircraft to identify and diagnose faults. This data is
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used to provide error identification and historical tracking to aide in fault troubleshooting
to optimize operations and maintenance efficiencies (The Boeing Corp, 2013).
Additionally, Boeing developed an Arena® discrete event simulation model for the civil
aviation sector to analyze the performance of health management options. (Williams,
2006) The AHM system performs similar functions as the ALIS system, with the
commercial addition of providing a decision tool to conduct critical profit analyses. As
shown with both the ALIS and AHM systems, prognostics integrated with maintenance
and supply chains can enable condition based maintenance. It is this end state that the Air
Force and DoD as a whole is striving to meet, not to turn a profit as in private industry,
but to continue operations in a shrinking fiscal environment.

Air Force Supply Issues
The General Accountability Office conducted several audits of DoD and in
particular Air Force supply systems over the past 20 years. Their findings range from
lack of items to enormous on-hand stock and unneeded parts on order accounting for
billions of dollars in unneeded parts and operational rates well below goals. (Government
Accountability Office, 2001; Government Accountability Office, 2007) “Having spare
parts available when needed to perform required maintenance is critical to the
Department of Defense’s accomplishment of its missions. Shortages of spare parts are a
key indicator of whether the billions of dollars annually spent on these parts are being
used in an effective, efficient, and economical manner,” (Government Accountability
Office, 2001, p. 1). “In January 2001, we reported on Department of Defense
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management challenges and noted that the Department has had serious weaknesses in its
management of logistics functions and, in particular, inventory management,”
(Government Accountability Office, 2001, p. 3). These GAO reports along with several
DoD initiatives to correct the findings are discussed in this section.
The spare parts shortage leads maintainers to cannibalize parts, leading to extra
work to fix the aircraft they “borrowed” from. This cannibalization opens the possibility
of damaging the needed part in removing it from the donor system as well as causing
collateral damage in the process. The “borrowed” part will also generally not last as long
as a new component, thus requiring additional maintenance (Government Accountability
Office, 2001). Reasons for parts shortages range from inadequate forecasting, repair and
manufacturing issues, poor replacement part reliability, and contracting problems. In one
extreme example, demand for an engine bolt was projected at 828 units when actual
requirements were over 12,000 in a single quarter. (Government Accountability Office,
2001) While this is an extreme example, it is indicative of problems with the forecasting
models used by the Air Force to determine part requirements. This issue was still present
in a 2010 review of DoD logistics citing poor requirements projections as a leading cause
of inventory shortages and surpluses (Atchley et al., 2010). Implementing ISHM/CBM
systems on a broad range across the service would increase the forecasting capability and
provide near real time insights into requirements, both existing and in the near future.
Between 2002 and 2005 Air Force spares shortages were, as seen in the Table 2 below,
between 6 and 8% of total requirements averaging over $1 billion is shortfalls. The
reasons given then were the same as in 2001 and again in 2010.
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Table 2. Air Force Inventory Shortages from FY 2002 through FY 2005

(Government Accountability Office, 2007)
A shortage of spares is not the only issue facing the Air Force. The GAO (2007)
stated that Air Force on-order spares without projected need for future use accounted for
$1.3 billion or 52% of on-order parts. DoD and Air Force policy do not incentivize or in
some cases allow for cancellation of orders without significant monetary penalties.
Additionally, between 2002 and 2005 65% of on-hand inventory, amounting to $18.7
billion, was not required for projected use rates. The additional inventory was calculated
by the GAO to cost another $15 million yearly for storage. Further compounding the
unneeded on-hand inventory is that some items have a shelf life that requires disposal or
refurbishment after a set amount of time. The problem does not lie entirely within the Air
Force supply system control. The DoD’s procurement policies drive sparing decisions to
be made between 2 and 4 years prior to actual need of the part due to lead times and the
DoD budgeting process (Atchley et al., 2010). This is a military issue that is not faced on
the same scale in the corporate arena. A 2010 study on DoD logistics does comment on
the difficulty of forecasting spares requirements stating these projections are rarely 100
percent accurate. The prognostics capability of ISHM systems can increase the reliability
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of spares forecasting and, depending on projected use rates, keep sparing purchases
within DoD budget timelines.
Because the military flies its aircraft beyond original service lives, B-52 and KC135 for example, supply and maintenance issues exist. On one hand, if repairs can be
made on long life items, it can save money, but when you need a new part eventually, the
supplier doesn’t make them anymore. An interesting dilemma arises when there is only
one entity driving demand for a system such as a military aircraft. Organic military repair
capabilities can drive the demand for the part so low it no longer makes financial sense
for the manufacturer to support smaller components, thus when the part can no longer be
repaired it cannot be purchased. Efforts to maintain industrial base through prescribed
purchases can keep production lines open but do little to address over supply of some
items in stock. Additionally, there is a demand driven issue for military hardware during
times of conflict. Post-September 11, 2001, Air Force aircraft experienced a marked
increase in sortie rates and flying hours, leaving logistics projections ineffective in
determining requirements (McCoy, 2011). While an ISHM/CBM system would do little
to project a wartime surge, it could provide a fleet-wide look at the remaining useful life
of parts and allow decisions on purchasing priorities to be made. The ability to extend the
life on systems through the prognostic capability of ISHM also allows aircraft to operate
closer to the safe life limits of parts as real time condition can be obtained. The goal of
ISHM enabled CBM systems is matching aircraft requirements with the supply and
maintenance processes. By ensuring parts are available when needed, while keeping only
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the required material on hand, supply and storage costs are reduced while maintenance
downtime can be managed.

Modeling Approaches
Rebulanan models 7 elements in his JAVA model simulating the JSF ALS
system: aircraft; health management system and LRUs; communication system; supply
(depot, base, and flightline) and; maintenance (Rebulanan, 2000). Rebulanan uses 3
MOPs to evaluate model performance. Aircraft availability, both the number of aircraft
per day and percentage available for mission (Ao), average number of sorties per day and
average wait time for supply. Rebulanan’s model shows sensitivity of the supply wait
time to the PHM detection lead time for an impending failure, and the supply stock
levels. This outcome is somewhat intuitive in that as the prognosis of an impending
failure is detected earlier and with greater accuracy, the supply system can plan further in
advance, ensuring parts are available when required. Malley (2001) developed a JAVA
model based on Rebulanan’s work with a focus on PHM intricacies. Malley examines
batching to make RUL predictions, that is, processing data grouped over a set duration
rather than instantaneously to dampen noise in the signal. The findings showed batch
processing decreased the false alarm rate over the life of a part, but delayed detection
time of impending failures.
Yager (2003) approached modeling autonomic logistics for aircraft as a queuing
theory model to examine sortie generation rates. The model shows a higher sortie
generation rate for the ISHM aircraft. Yager’s model does have some drawbacks for
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implementation on a larger and closer to realistic system in that there is no penalty for
false alarms in the ISHM system and prognosis is assumed to be perfect.
Rodrigues and Yoneyama (2012; 2013) explore the effect of prognostics on spare
parts inventories for both repairable and non-repairable systems compared with
conventional supply processes. Both studies, simulated over 15 years each, show cost
savings for the ISHM enabled system over the conventional one. For the non-repairable
model a discrete event simulation is used and considers parts, storage and out of stock
costs. Out of stock costs are difficult to quantify but do impact downtime for supply,
which is where the impact is captured in this research model. The supply system is
represented by a reorder point and an order quantity with varying levels for each. In the
conventional system these are fixed, but in the ISHM model they are updated based upon
system inferences. A limitation of this study is that only one item is investigated, leaving
interactions of multiple components in question.
Exploring the effect of RUL inferences on repairable systems Rodrigues and
Yoneyama (2013) found an improvement in fleet availability through managing when
items were sent for repair. Holding, repair and out of stock costs were used again as the
measure for cost. Sparing levels were varied for the systems and costs and system
availability favored the ISHM scenario at each level. This model does not include
maintenance costs or interactions thus the system availability cannot be considered
operational availability.
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Summary of Gaps
The review of current literature in this chapter highlights that most modeling
efforts lack inclusion of logistics in their research. As such, the models cannot
comprehensively explore the interactions between ISHM, CBM and logistics systems.
Further, the inclusion of multiple systems in this research, a squadron of aircraft with
multiple components is left unexplored. This gap could yield additional cost and time
savings if the health monitoring, maintenance and logistics system interactions can be
synchronized. Using the information above to optimize or group maintenance activities
while maximizing AO and minimizing cost for a system of systems, is another area of
research open for study. Further approaches and their associated benefits and limitations
are discussed in chapters 4-7.
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III. System Architecture and Metrics

Methods to Evaluate ISHM/CBM Systems
The DoD explains Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) as the use of
processes and technologies to increase the reliability and maintenance effectiveness of
systems (Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May,
2008). Further, maintenance is performed based on need utilizing systems engineering
approaches to collect and analyze data in support of the decision-making processes. The
DoD Condition Based Maintenance+ Guidebook prescribes four life-cycle sustainment
outcome metrics to evaluate CBM+ implementation in the Total Life Cycle Systems
Management (TLCSM) process:
Materiel availability (MA) is a measure of the percentage of the total inventory of
a system that is operationally capable (ready for tasking) of performing an
assigned mission at a given time, based on materiel condition. It can be expressed
mathematically as the number of operational end items [FMC] divided by the
total population [fleet size]. Materiel availability also indicates the percentage of
time a system is operationally capable of performing an assigned mission.
Materiel reliability (MR) is a measure of the probability the system will perform
without failure over a specific interval. Reliability must be sufficient to support
the warfighting capability needed. Materiel reliability is generally expressed in
terms of a mean time between failures (MTBF), and, once operational, can be
measured by dividing actual operating hours by the number of failures
experienced during a specific interval.
Ownership cost (OC) balances the sustainment solution by ensuring the O&S
costs associated with materiel readiness are considered when making decisions.
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Mean downtime (MDT) is the average total time required to restore an asset to
its full operational capabilities. MDT includes the time from… an asset being
down to the asset being given back to operations or production to operate.
(Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May,
2008, p. 1-5)

The above metrics align with the Sustainment key performance parameter (KPP)
spelled out in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)
manual (2015). Falling under the availability KPP, MA and AO represent operational
capability. Material reliability maps to the JCIDS reliability KSA, and OC falls under the
O&S cost KSA. The combination of these high level metrics is an aggregation of the
measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) for the baseline
and monitored systems.

Systems Architecture Approach
The foundation of an architecture for a system is the ability to map key program
objectives to system performance and design. Table 3 lists the interaction between key
CBM+ objectives and the aforementioned metrics where MA is materiel availability, MR
is materiel reliability, OC is the ownership cost and MDT is the mean downtime. The
four metrics are discussed further in the next section. These objectives are not all
quantitatively measurable, but must still be considered and assessed when qualitatively
evaluating the system. In mapping these objectives to the metrics, the DoD provides a
conduit for candidate approaches to ensure they meet the goals for the process. The
relationship between objectives and their respective metrics and subsequent
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decomposition into system level measures of performance affords the opportunity to
compare multiple approaches using the same upper level metrics.
Table 3. CBM+ Objectives and Metrics
OBJECTIVE
MA MR OC MDT
Enhance maintenance effectiveness with integrated
X
X
maintenance and logistics systems
X
Incorporate advanced engineering, maintenance,
logistics/supply chain, configuration management, and
information technologies
X
Employ weapon system designs that use measurable,
consistent, and accurate predictive parameters from
embedded CBM capabilities
Improve data about maintenance operations and parts/system
X
X
performance
X
X
X
Improve advanced diagnostics, system prognostics, and health X
management capabilities based on current condition data
Provide more accurate item tracking capabilities
X
Reduce maintenance requirements by performing
X
X
maintenance tasks only upon evidence of need (more
proactive/predictive, less preventive and less corrective)
Enable more effective maintenance training
X
Create a smaller maintenance and logistic footprint
X
Improve maintenance capabilities, business processes,
supply/maintenance planning, and responsiveness leading to
optimum weapon system availability
Minimize unique support equipment and information
systems for individual weapon systems
Improve system maintainability as a part of design
modification through the use of reliability analysis
Provide interoperability/jointness to the warfighter

X

X
X
X

X
X

(Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008)
Detailed cost comparisons, made possible by comprehensive system architecture,
along with maintainability studies provide the foundation for assessing the feasibility of a
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SHM system to compliment CBM. As Grubic (2009) points out, many approaches to
ISHM/CBM “have been developed by engineers for engineers and therefore suffer from
lack of business input. The latter brings with it a view of the customer, and the cultural
and process drivers that are so important to the success” (p. 2). Byer lays out a process to
evaluate an ISHM/CBM system: 37
1. Define a Baseline System without PHM and the Aircraft System with PHM;
2. Develop Reliability and Maintainability Predictions for the Components of the
Aircraft;
3. Define the Measures of PHM Effectiveness;
4. Metrics Associated with the Measures of Effectiveness;
5. Estimating the Impact of PHM on Reducing the Cost of Consumables;
6. Estimating the Impact of PHM on Reducing Maintenance manpower Costs;
7. Estimating the Non-recurring and Recurring Costs of Providing PHM;
8. Develop the Cost Benefit Results;
9. Estimating the Impact of PHMs on Non Dollar Denominated Benefits;
a. Sortie Generation Capability
b. Reduction in the Incidence of Major Accidents (Byer et al., 2001, p.
3098).
In new structures and vehicles, including both CBM and ISHM in the system
architecture early in the process allows for trade-offs to be made on cost, complexity and
operational availability (AO). For fielded systems, the complexity increases since most
systems are deployed without health monitoring allowances and must be retrofitted
which, depending on level of access, can carry significant cost and weight penalties.
Sensors and their associated cables or wireless communication system and, if applicable,
on-board diagnostic system have weight and power requirements also which can have
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significant performance impacts in the case of aircraft. System availability is linked to the
balance of sensor reliability and detectability and the capability of the system to decrease
maintenance duration (Hoyle, Mehr, Turner, & Chen, 2007).
As stated previously, the benefits of ISHM are the abilities to reduce inspection
length, defer maintenance and migrate to maintenance on demand or CBM (Speckmann,
2007). All of these items have the end goal to increase operational availability through
reduced maintenance time. The link between the CBM program and the SHM technology
is system architecture. Within sectors of industry, there are attempts to define standards
or common operating practices and to persuade governments and private companies to
invest in SHM technology to reduce overall maintenance costs. These will in turn enable
measuring the effectiveness and cost of individual systems.
Applying ISHM enables CBM in lieu of preprogrammed periodic maintenance
practices, that is, maintaining only when required instead of when prescribed by
schedules, thus optimizing maintenance labor (Roach, 2009). All of the SHM
technologies and resulting modified maintenance programs serve to reduce the total
acquisition cost of a system with increased availability. System reliability is also cited as
a reason for the lack of further adoption of the technology. Seaver et al. (2012) state that
most ISHM systems lack demonstrated reliability in the field beyond estimates which, in
turn, discourages program managers from investing in the technology for deployable
systems. To gain user trust in predictions ISHM systems should compile and quantify
uncertainty to provide some confidence interval around predictions.
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Processing CBM data can prove cumbersome as well. Depending on the scope
and size of the system, the ISHM platform can produce terabytes of data every month
(Seaver et al., 2012). Methods to collect, process, analyze and store this data must be
accounted for when developing and assessing an ISHM system (Farrar & Worden, 2007).
While this is a measure to track and be aware of for a system, modeling this falls under
final design for the system and will not be included in this model. The cost associated
with the design, development, implementation and maintenance of these systems must be
accounted for in the ISHM model in order to provide an accurate comparison of the cost
benefit of the baseline system versus the ISHM/CBM system.

Model Functionality
Figure 3 lays out the process flows and functional components of for the baseline,
no ISHM, aircraft through the models in this research. ISHM architecture is presented in
chapter 4 and inherent ISHM processes are discussed. The models are designed to
account for the processes and decisions in the appropriate flows. Following this process
ensures the ability to capture the required processing times and failures for calculation of
system impacts.
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Figure 3. Baseline Activity Diagram
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In the nominal baseline model in Figure 3 the aircraft are tasked for a mission and then
proceed to a preflight inspection, mission execution, post flight inspection and routine
maintenance before returning to the mission queue. Off-ramps can occurs if inspections
reveal faults that require correction or if there is an in flight emergency (IFE). Following
the identification of faults, the aircraft receives a detailed inspection to isolate and locate
the offending component or line replaceable unit (LRU) for repair or replacement, a
supply requisition is generated and the stock level is checked. If the part(s) are in stock
they are sent to maintenance to repair the aircraft. If the required items are not in stock,
they must be ordered and the aircraft is down awaiting supply. Upon repair of the aircraft,
the system is again checked for damage. If no damage is detected, the aircraft is sent back
into service, repeating the cycle until the aircraft is retired or destroyed. The ISHM
enabled CBM architecture is discussed in chapter 4.

Data Flow
The schematic outlined in Figure 4 shows the information that is transferred
between the different system nodes in the ISHM model. The ISHM system updates the
CBM system with systems health and RULs. This information is then processed by the
CBM system, which determines maintenance and supply requirements. Supply
requirements are sent to the supply system and parts statuses are returned. Likewise,
maintenance windows and the subsystems to be repaired are sent from the CBM system
to maintenance and maintenance updates the CBM system on status of repairs. All of this
information is tracked to ensure enough aircraft are available for mission taskings.
42

Figure 4. ISHM/CBM Data Flow
Viewed in another manner, the flow of information in Figure 4 is decomposed to
show the sequence of event flows within the model. This flow, shown in Figure 5, depicts
where information is transferred between model nodes and the result of data queries
between nodes. Iterative items are shown in the loop boxes and continue during missions
to ensure updates to system health and processing are populated throughout the system.
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Figure 5. ISHM/CBM Sequence Diagram

Model Verification and Validation
Verification is the process of determining if the model is an accurate
representation of the architecture and its processes and that those processes contain the
correct information. The Arena® model in this work was checked against the system
architectures in Figure 3 and Figure 6 to ensure proper inclusion of processes and
decision points. Additionally, the data flow in Figure 4 and sequence in Figure 5 dictated
model information sharing.
During model development, checks for reasonableness, i.e., inputs map to logical
outputs, were conducted for individual elements and processes. Data were also output to
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a spreadsheet at discrete points in the model to ensure logical behavior of the modeled
parameters. In the process of conducting these checks, small errors in logic and formulas
were discovered and corrected. Arena® has the capability to animate models, which
allowed the author to follow entities throughout the model processes to ensure proper
paths were followed. Further, random distributions were held as fixed values to simplify
checking of timing and equations throughout the model. Verification of the finished
model was conducted through checks of outputs with progressively changing inputs to
verify logical shifts in outputs.
Validation is process of assurance that the data processed by the model is
consistent with expected and real-world information and is performed by analyzing
model simulations. In this work, validation is a difficult task as the systems are
theoretical and randomly generated as are many of the processes undergone in the model.
As such, there are no real-world results to compare the simulation data with for validation
purposes. Therefore, what remains is to validate model assumptions and random
distributions for processes to ensure their reasonableness. Distributions for model
processes are meant to represent simple inspection and replacement tasks that can be
conducted in a timely manner as opposed to an overhaul of an entire aircraft, which
would require considerably more time. The distributions, therefore, are deemed valid for
this requirement. Further, the underlying assumptions appear valid and discrepancies are
annotated and discussed.
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Summary
The architecture and evaluation techniques laid out in this chapter establish the
processes and methods used in the remainder of this research. The establishment of a
system architecture early in the design process aids in ensuring relevant processes and
procedures are captured and define inputs and outputs required for successful
implementation. The remaining chapters of this dissertation detail the research methods,
results and conclusions relevant to the implementation of a condition based maintenance
program enabled through integrated systems health management.
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III. Prognostic Uncertainty

Chapter Overview
Across many industries, systems are exceeding their intended design lives,
whether they are ships, bridges or military aircraft. As a result failure rates can increase
and unanticipated wear or failure conditions can arise. Health monitoring research and
application has the potential to more safely lengthen the service life of a range of systems
through utilization of sensor data and knowledge of failure mechanisms to predict
component life remaining. A further benefit of health monitoring when combined across
an entire platform is system health management. System health management is an enabler
of condition based maintenance, which allows repair or replacement based on material
condition, not a set time. Replacement of components based on condition can enable cost
savings through fewer parts being used and the associated maintenance costs. The goal of
this research is to show the management of system health can provide savings in
maintenance and logistics cost while increasing vehicle availability through the approach
of condition based maintenance.
This work examines the impact of prediction accuracy uncertainty in remaining
useful life prognostics for a squadron of 12 aircraft. The uncertainty in this research is
introduced in the system through an uncertainty factor applied to the useful life
prediction. An Arena® discrete event simulation is utilized to explore the effect of
prediction error on availability, reliability, and maintenance and logistics processes.
Aircraft are processed through preflight, flight, and post-flight operations, as well as
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maintenance and logistics activities. A baseline case with traditional time-driven
maintenance is performed for comparison to the condition based maintenance approach
of this research.
This research does not consider cost or decision making processes, instead
focusing on utilization parameters of both aircraft and manpower. The occurrence and
impact of false alarms on system performance is examined. The results show the potential
availability, reliability, and maintenance benefits of a health monitoring system and
explore the diagnostic uncertainty.

Background
Across military and commercial fleets, aircraft are an example where lengthening
service lives and budget constraints can adversely affect safety. As a result, more
frequent inspections are required as service life increases to ensure safety of the users and
the environment. However, the cost of large scale modifications or replacement in the
case of hundreds of aircraft is a significant hurdle to overcome in most instances (Shoup
et al., 2011). The impact of shrinking budgets can also reduce inspection frequency or
delay needed repairs in favor of only performing mission critical tasks (Roach, 2009).
Maintenance strategies must change to meet the extended in-service requirements and the
constraints imposed by shrinking government and industry budgets.
Condition based maintenance (CBM) is an evolving maintenance concept with a
goal of reducing maintenance and thus life cycle costs while increasing operational
availability made possible, in part, by leveraging health monitoring techniques.
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Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 4151.22 defines CBM as “the application and
integration of appropriate processes, technologies, and knowledge-based capabilities to
achieve the target availability, reliability, and operation and support costs of DoD
systems and components across their life cycle,” (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L),
May 2008, p. 1-1). Integrated system health management and its impact on performance,
cost, supply chain as well as traditional maintenance inspections and practices are the
focus of this research. With the F-35 maintenance and logistics alone projected to cost
$1.1 trillion over the 55 year life span amid shrinking defense budgets, the need to reduce
the life cycle cost (LCC) of military aircraft is paramount (Shalal-Esa, 2013).
Additionally, legacy aircraft may not be fitted with the proper sensors to fully implement
health assessment leading to costly inspections, in both time and maintenance dollars.
This reduces operational availability (Ao) and the funds available for other needs. CBM
is a demand driven maintenance process based on indications of stresses or impending
failure of a component or system. When appropriately applied, CBM has the potential to
reduce life cycle cost and increase mission reliability by eliminating unnecessary
maintenance actions (Butcher, 2000). Ellis (2008) argues that cost-effective systems
monitoring allows repair actions based on system condition rather than costly time-based
maintenance. Additionally, maintenance may be forecast for completion that minimizes
impact on the operational mission of the system. Secondary failures, where one
component’s failure causes adverse performance or accelerated degradation of
interrelated components, may also be reduced by implementing CBM as a result of
prompt repair or replacement of the primary cause of fault.
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CBM compares data collected from vehicle systems and their components and
compares that information with a predetermined threshold prior to failure, or to failure for
some non-critical components, then dictates repairs or replacement of parts. Additionally,
interim time-based inspections required under the baseline preventive maintenance (PM)
approach are forgone, or significantly reduced in frequency, in lieu of continuous analysis
of the aircraft via the integrated systems health management (ISHM) system.CBM
requires sensor or inspection data to accurately diagnose the condition of a component.
Manual inspections can prove costly in terms of time to perform if the part requires
disassembly or removal of other components to observe its condition. Technology exists
for some, and is under development for other components, to determine wear or
impending failure conditions in lieu of manual inspections (Glaser et al., 2007;
Speckmann, 2007). The data from these health monitoring sensors may then be compiled
to predict remaining useful life. Certainty is not 100%, be it in the interpretation of data
collected on component condition or in prediction of remaining life based on that sensor
data. This uncertainty has the potential to lead to poor estimation of component
condition, which can result in false conclusions about safety of flight decisions and
ultimately to critical failures.
Integrated Systems Health Management Enabler
The benefits of ISHM are the abilities to reduce inspection length, defer
maintenance and migrate to maintenance on demand with the end goal to increase
operational availability through reduced maintenance time (Speckmann, 2007). Applying
ISHM enables CBM as opposed to preprogrammed periodic maintenance practices; that
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is, maintaining only when required instead of when prescribed by schedules, thus
optimizing maintenance labor (Roach, 2009). SHM technologies and resulting modified
maintenance programs serve to reduce the total life-cycle cost of a system and increase
availability. While this may drive increased acquisition cost of a weapon system or
aircraft due to the inclusion of health monitoring systems, the goal is to offset the
increase with reduced operations and maintenance costs over the life of the program.
Published literature shows the savings potential of ISHM enabled condition based
maintenance on aircraft life cycle cost:


40% for vehicle maintenance (Walls et al., 1999)



30% to 50% for fuselage panels (Pattabhiraman et al., 2010)



10% electrical components (Scanff et al., 2007)



50-80% for the Boeing 777 (Gorinevsky, Gordon, Beard, Kumar, & Chang,
2005).

In general, an application project could choose to increase the detection
capability, accepting a higher acquisition cost with the goal of lowering the overall
system life cycle cost through more efficient operations and maintenance. For a given
detection system, however, increasing the detection capability (e.g., lowering a threshold)
will come at the expense of a degraded false alarm rate; the two are competing objectives.
Ultimately, the value of the prognostic system will depend on the achievable balance
between detectability for safety concerns and acceptable false alarm rates to avoid
unnecessary and expensive maintenance actions. Aircraft, or other vehicle, availability is
linked to the balance of sensor reliability and detectability and the capability of the
system to decrease maintenance duration (Hoyle et al., 2007).
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It is important to understand that uncertainty will exist in the diagnosis and
prognosis of system health. Numerous points of entry exist for uncertainty to work its
way into remaining useful life (RUL) prediction. Component performance data is
dependent on sensor health and accuracy. It is also difficult to anticipate the exact
conditions, load, environment, etc, that the vehicle or machine will undergo during
operation or storage. Quantifying and compiling these uncertainties is a difficult task
individually and made harder by potential amplifying effects on each other.
Sankararaman and Goebel (2013) discuss factors of uncertainty in RUL prediction and
lay out methods to quantify and interpret the sources. They also stress the need to
accurately determine the uncertainty in the prediction for the prediction to be of use. The
goal is that the probabilistic estimates of RUL based on real time monitoring allow
increased time to accumulate on parts, thus increasing the MTBF for the ISHM aircraft
and generating savings through fewer spares procurements or repair actions.
Determining the effectiveness of system health monitoring approaches requires a
method for comparison of techniques. The remainder of this paper discusses modeling
approaches, evaluation techniques and results of this research.
Modeling Approaches
Research into the effects of prognostics on integrated logistics, maintenance and
aircraft systems frequently neglects the impact of uncertainty on HM model outcomes.
Rebulanan utilizes a discrete event simulation to represent the F-35 autonomic logistic
system (ALS) system with a health management system, LRUs, communication system,
supply, and maintenance systems (Rebulanan, 2000). Rebulanan further evaluates
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performance with aircraft availability, mission capable and non-mission capable rates,
and mission reliability. Rebulanan’s model shows sensitivity of the supply wait time to
the detection lead time for an impending failure and the supply stock levels. This
outcome is somewhat intuitive in that as the prognosis of an impending failure is detected
earlier and with greater accuracy, the supply system can plan further in advance, ensuring
parts are available when required.
Rodrigues and Yoneyama (2012; 2013) explore the effect of prognostics on spare
parts inventories for both repairable and non-repairable systems compared with
conventional supply processes. Both studies, simulated over 15 years each, show cost
savings for the ISHM enabled system over the conventional one. In their work on nonrepairable items they discuss uncertainty in failures and their impact on supply policy, but
they do not include the impact of prognostic uncertainty on maintenance operations for
false alarm adjudication or aircraft operational availability. Similarly, while they do
address prognostic error in repairable systems they focus on the impact of sparing to
account for fleet availability without addressing false alarms and how they might drive
costs. Both works provide an excellent analysis of the cost impact of sparing decisions
based upon health monitoring information. Out of stock costs are difficult to quantify but
do impact downtime for supply, which is where the impact is captured in our research
model. A limitation of the nor-repairable study is that only one item is investigated,
leaving interactions of multiple components in question.
Kählert, Giljohanan, and Klingauf (2014) utilize a MATLAB discrete event
simulation to analyze one Lufthansa A320 component with 100% unscheduled
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replacement. They utilize process times, reliability, prognostic accuracy, and cost to
evaluate PHM system performance. Additionally, the use of historic Lufthansa
maintenance data provides added realism in the research. The research focus only extends
for two weeks around a replacement, thus leaving out some potential for a false alarm
condition to exist prematurely. One of their final conclusions is a realistic PHM system
could save approximately 20% of annual fleet operation costs.
Model description
In this research, an Arena® discrete event simulation is utilized to represent a
squadron of 12 aircraft and their associated mission, maintenance and supply processes
over a 15 year duration. This model explores the impacts to this squadron in analyzing a
model containing elements not addressed in the works of section 2. The authors add
uncertainty not found in Rebulanan’s work with an interaction of multiple components
missing from Rodriques and Yoneyama.
Model Components and Architecture
The initial component failure properties were randomly generated from a
uniform(250,1000) distribution for parts A-T. These times are then utilized for
component replacements in the model. Each aircraft is generated and assigned 20
components with a failure time randomly sampled from an exponential distribution, with
mean time between failure (MTBF) given in Table 1, and with probability density
function: f ( x) 

1

e

 x

, for x  0 . The exponential distribution is chosen as a

representative reliability function for the components for simplicity in model calculations
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of the constant failure rate. The model can readily accept another failure distribution
with other components.
Table 4. Components Failure Times
Part
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T

MTBF (hours)
502
280
775
750
763
364
441
829
769
941
778
363
272
642
696
268
822
585
996
842

The sampled failure times are considered “truth” in terms of component failure
times. That is, if the line replaceable unit (LRU) incurs more than the associated failure
time in hours without being repaired or preemptively replaced as a result of scheduled
preventive maintenance, overhaul in the baseline case or ISHM indicated replacement in
the prognostic case, a failure occurs. Aircraft flow through preflight processing and
mission preparation prior to actually flying an assigned mission. The ISHM system
performs a scan to determine if the aircraft is anticipated to have enough useful life to
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complete the mission. Each component decreases its life only during engine running
operations: taxi, take-off, flying, landing and parking. In this work, it is assumed that
LRUs operate until failure. These processes are visually depicted in Figure 6.
After sortie completion, diagnostics are again performed and in the baseline case,
maintenance is performed as well. ISHM aircraft perform post flight scan and if
acceptable are released for next flight. Baseline aircraft are inspected and checked for
LRU preventive maintenance time. If PM is not required, routine maintenance and
inspections are performed and the aircraft released for next mission. Aircraft are then
either parked until their next mission or turned for another flight.
In the maintenance module, the number of indicated failures is recorded and the
maintenance clock starts. A detailed inspection is performed for both the ISHM and
baseline cases, though shorter for the ISHM case. False alarms are recorded and in the
ISHM case if a false alarm threshold over the lifetime of the part is reached, the ISHM
system undergoes maintenance. The model indicates a false alarm condition if the
predicted component RUL is less than the “truth” remaining time minus a safety factor
and the anticipated sortie duration. In the baseline case supply stock is reduced and if not
in stock the aircraft is grounded until the part arrives. Parts are processed by supply
(occurs simultaneously with other aircraft operations in the ISHM case) and transferred
from supply to maintenance. Aircraft are maintained and LRU(s) life characteristics are
resampled from the failure distribution(s) in Table 1. The aircraft repair is checked and
the vehicle is routed back into the mission queue. In the ISHM case, if the standby time
until the next mission is greater than the mean time to perform any outstanding
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maintenance actions, the aircraft is routed to be maintained so as not to impact mission
operations. In the baseline case, unless the part is scheduled for preventive maintenance
the condition is not known thus the need for repair or replacement is unanticipated and
the aircraft continues normal mission operations. Maintenance actions are performed
serially on each aircraft, that is, only one inspection or maintenance action at a time,
continuing until all required actions are complete. This assumption likely over constrains
maintenance personnel actions, leading to slightly higher maintenance delays, but is done
for model simplicity and has the same effect on the baseline and health monitoring cases.
It is assumed that all component inspection times for indicated or actual failures are
triangularly distributed (20, 30, 45) minutes and LRU replacements triangularly
distributed (60, 90, 240) minutes. These times were chosen to represent a range of repairs
and inspections while not portraying items which may require multiple days to maintain.
Additionally, in this research required personnel for maintenance actions are always
considered available. LRUs are always replaced when they are serviced.
Supplies are input into the model at an initial stock level and a reorder point. In
both the baseline and ISHM cases, the stock level and reorder points are fixed for the
simulation. The levels are discussed further in section 3.2. Once reorder point is reached,
the difference between stock level and reorder point is ordered. Time between order and
delivery is log-normally distributed (2,1) days for all parts. Additionally, a processing
time upon receipt is incurred.
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Figure 6. ISHM System Architecture
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If RUL is within a 10 hour safety factor from failure the aircraft is routed to
maintenance. If RUL is within a prescribed lead time window, a supply check is
performed and if parts aren’t in stock they are ordered to meet predicted maintenance
activities. If RUL is within a defined maintenance window, component service can occur
if parts are in stock or the aircraft can continue flying missions if there is sufficient RUL.
Sensor and Prognostics Process
The ISHM routine begins by computing the remaining useful life (RUL) of each
component. The RUL prognosis has two components, the diagnosis from the HM system
and the prediction uncertainty. In this research component diagnostics is taken as perfect,
i.e., sensor always knows exact health. In new components sensor diagnostics can have
difficulty detecting the health state, thus providing data that may not be useful. As failure
becomes more imminent, sensor diagnostics can provide a more exact condition
diagnosis. The resulting determination leads to component RUL being predicted as:

LRU RUL  lognormal(Diagnosis, uncertainty)

(1)

Where Diagnosis is the log mean and equivalent to the true remaining life and,
uncertainty is the log standard deviation defined in Eq. (2).
Uncertainty is varied in this research to determine the impact of uncertain
prognostics on Ao and sortie rates. Uncertainty is calculated as:

uncertainty  ln( Part RUL)* uncertainty factor

(2)

Where Part RUL is the previous RUL prediction for that part and, uncertainty factor is a
design variable.
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This information is sent to the CBM module where maintenance predictions are
performed. While no specific RUL prognostic technique is used, the technique above is
utilized to represent compounded error or uncertainty built up in the system. Initially,
RUL estimation is chiefly impacted by the uncertainty factor, but in section 4.2,
additional degradation to the system is added to account for sensor diagnostic losses. Eqs.
(1) and (2) are representative equations developed by the authors to portray the behavior
of health monitoring systems. They are not intended to mimic the performance of a
particular system, but to represent the functionality of a monitoring system. The
uncertainty factor is a representation of the accumulated variability in the prognostics for
remaining useful life. This work ranges the uncertainty factor from a low of 0, to
represent perfect prognosis, to a high of 100, which approaches half the MTBF of some
parts. Examining a range of variability between these end points allows system designers
to quantify how much uncertainty is acceptable in a health monitoring system before
selecting one for inclusion on an aircraft.
The system then enters a decision node where the RUL is compared to a set safety
factor, which would be a policy decision based on mission requirements. If there is RUL
above the safety factor and the projected sortie length does not encroach on the safety
factor, the aircraft is cleared for flight. If the RUL is below the safety factor, the
component(s) are flagged and sent to maintenance. If RUL is sufficient, the aircraft is
cleared for the next process. In all, the aircraft is checked prior to mission preparation
(fuelling and cargo loading), prior to take-off, during flight, and upon landing. If all of
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these checks are satisfactory the aircraft continues through missions and standby time
until a maintenance action is required.
The CBM system preorders parts to meet demands as described above. If the part
is not in stock, the aircraft is placed in a non-mission capable supply hold until the part
arrives. Upon maintenance completion, the ISHM equipped aircraft bypasses additional
check-outs normally performed to inspect work, instead relying on the ISHM system to
perform them. The aircraft is then released for the next mission tasking.
Evaluation Parameters
Establishment of useful performance measures to evaluate the model is essential.
To that end, metrics currently used to determine aircraft and system performance are
preferred as a means of comparison. Three categories of metrics, although interwoven,
are laid out below and are used when discussing the results of this research: availability;
reliability; and maintenance.
Availability
To understand operational availability and why it is a good measure of system
performance for this model, it is useful to be familiar with achieved and inherent
availabilities as well.
Inherent availability (Ai) is the availability of a system operating under an ideal
support system. This means delays for logistics, administrative delays and preventive
maintenance time are excluded, leaving only operating time and corrective maintenance.
Achieved Availability (Aa) adds preventive maintenance to Ai in addition to
corrective maintenance. Logistics, supply and administrative delays are ignored and those
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assets are assumed to be instantaneously available when required. Achieved availability
is determined examining the mean time between maintenance, MTBM, and the mean
maintenance time (MMT).
Operational availability (Ao) adds the final piece to the downtime portion of the
equation. Ao includes logistics, supply and administrative delays to the PM and CM for
the system resulting in the mean downtime for the system. Operational availability is the
system availability the user of a system realizes, (ReliaSoft, 2007). Mathematically,
operational availability is:

Ao 

Uptime
MTBM

Uptime  Downtime MTBM  MMT  MLDT

(3)

Where MLDT is the mean logistics delay time.
Eq. (3) is not the only way to define operational availability. Pryor (2008)
discusses methods to calculate Ao seen in Eq. (4) using the uptime/(uptime + downtime)
definition of Eq. (3), but the definition is slightly different.
Ao 

OT  ST
OT  ST  TPM  TCM  TALDT

(4)

Where OT is the operational time, ST is the standby time, TPM is the total preventive
maintenance time, TCM is the total corrective maintenance time, and TALDT is the total
administrative and logistics delay time, equivalent to MLDT.
Figure 7 shows the components of up and downtimes. This is by no means an
exhaustive list and further breakdowns are possible, especially in the administrative and
logistics delay blocks, but for this research these components define the temporal
parameters.
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Figure 7. Components of System Usage Time (Pryor, 2008)
A function of a system’s operational availability, average daily flying hours is a
measurement of the ability of the squadron as a whole to perform the assigned missions.
Further, the number of sorties flown per day is a function of the mission requirements,
but also the performance of the aircraft as well as maintenance and logistics systems.
Reliability
In the commercial environment, up and downtimes can also be assigned costs as
the systems impact revenue generation. Kählert, Giljohanan and Klingauf discuss
dispatch reliability, or the “ratio of revenue departures without delay or cancellations
compared to all flights,” (2014, p.1). They go on to summarize commercial aircraft cost
accounting for delays and cancellations. Downtime has an associated cost beyond
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maintenance labor in lost revenue. Similarly, uptime has the potential to generate
revenue, when not in a standby capacity. For military systems, assigning costs to up and
downtime is problematic as there is no profit to generate and supporting national security
is difficult to assign a value to. In essence, military aircraft are consumptive, always
operating at a loss. Policy and research can, however, strive to reduce these consumption
costs.
False alarms diagnosed or predicted by the ISHM system drive unnecessary
maintenance and supply actions as well as placing an otherwise mission capable aircraft
into a NMC state. These maintenance and supply actions increase the overall cost impact
of the ISHM system as they are not free. A key requirement for successful deployment of
an ISHM architecture enabling CBM is a low false alarm rate with reliable detection
(Ellis, 2008; A. Van Horenbeek et al., 2013). False alarms in the baseline model result
from CND and RTOK discussed previously. Totals for each of the models will be
recorded for comparison. Additionally, an increase in false alarms, above a
predetermined threshold, on an aircraft with an ISHM system will trigger an inspection of
the ISHM system sensors providing erroneous data and potentially of the ISHM system
logic itself.
The ability to tolerate false alarms is a two-fold evaluation. First, the cost
associated with each false alarm shrinks any cost benefit of the ISHM system over the
baseline system. Second, too many false alarms can trigger a “cry wolf” attitude towards
the system or result in wasted time maintaining, or checking the system thus decreasing
the operational availability of the aircraft and the reliability of the ISHM system. For an
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ISHM architecture to be effective it cannot trigger excessive false alarms which, in turn,
trigger maintenance actions on the system.
Maintenance and Logistics
Inspection intervals are time-driven processes under the baseline aircraft case and
are prescribed to monitor systems for indications of damage. They are generally based on
historic or predicted failure data and are conducted to ensure early indications of failure
are discovered before they catastrophically fail the system or adjacent components. An
assumption for this research is that all systems of interest on the aircraft are monitored in
the ISHM model. If that were not the case time-based, but informed through ISHM
inferences, inspections would still be required. In this research, the ISHM case only
requires inspection upon indication of failure or impending failure by the system.
Therefore, the inspection intervals should be further apart and of shorter duration for
ISHM than for time-based methods. The preprogrammed PM inspections of the baseline
are defined based on operating hours.
Accounting for the required time to repair and inspect aircraft is critical in
determining the impacts of system changes to downtime and manpower costs. In addition
to the repair of malfunctioning components, inspections based upon fault indications,
either in performance or indicated by the ISHM system, drive mission unavailability and
decrease system performance metrics. A common metric is to measure the required
maintenance man hours per aircraft flight hour or MMH/FH. This factor can then be
utilized in forecasting manpower requirements and required downtime-based on mission
requirements. Similarly, mean downtime (MDT), the average amount of time it takes to
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return an aircraft to flying status once a fault is indicated, is a commonly used
maintenance performance metric.
Supply delay is the time between actual part need and when the supply system
delivers the part to maintenance and will impact both the baseline and ISHM/CBM cases.
Non-mission capable supply (NMCS) is the common measure of this supply delay. The
prognostic CBM case will anticipate failure and sparing requirements further out from
maintenance demand and allow for advanced ordering if stock levels are inadequate. The
current baseline process relies on anticipating failures and providing stock levels at
individual bases or in some cases a central location that can be tasked to deliver spares
when required. This process increases the logistic footprint by requiring storage facilities
for materiel that may not be needed for upwards of a year. Managing these spares and the
facility requires additional resources, manpower and money. “Logistics response time, a
measure of supportability and an indirect measure of readiness,” (Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May, 2008, p. 6-4), drives
shorter maintenance times and as such impacts supply and maintenance downtime.
While maintenance policy and cost decisions impact LRU replacement decisions,
the prognostics capability plays an important role in determining when to repair or
exchange components. Confidence in the performance of the diagnostics and prognostics
systems could lead to a decreasing safety factor as to when maintenance occurs. This
resulting increase in useable time of each part saves money through extended service life
for the components and reduces the amount of supplies consumed. Capturing the amount
of useful life lost for the components can quantify the gains that may be achievable.
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Model Variables
This research explores the impact of RUL prediction uncertainty on the
availability, reliability, and maintenance and logistics categories above. Evaluation of the
model is accomplished through simulation of 15 years of aircraft utilization. Further, two
design cases are initially utilized in the simulations. The remaining useful life uncertainty
factor is varied at 14 levels with two false alarm limits at 0 and 10000 and the model
assessed at each increment. The levels for the FA limit is meant to indicate that at 0, the
ISHM system is always maintained after a false alarm and at 10000, policy allows nearly
unlimited false alarms by the ISHM system before requiring repair. These levels are
found in Table 5. At each uncertainty factor 100 simulations are run to establish
confidence in the results, and the means of these data are presented. Sensitivity to values
of FA limit greater than 0 is presented later in this paper once sensor and prognostics
degradation are considered. Additionally, two simulations of the baseline case with no
prognostics are run where component stock levels are varied.
Stock levels for the ISHM case are held to 1 nominally and ordered as predicted
by the system. In the baseline case, two comparisons are examined, one where the stock
levels are kept the same as the ISHM case. The other stock level case holds 4 parts in
stock and reorders when the level drops to 2. This variance of stock level for the baseline
case makes the process comparable to minimal levels as in the ISHM case and robust
levels when failure is somewhat uncertain.
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Results
No ISHM Degradation Results
Daily flying hour averages for all simulation runs are located in Table 5. It is
noted in these data that a decrease of 19.04 flying hours per day occurs over the range of
uncertainty factors for a FA limit of 0. This decrease is smaller when the FA limit is
10000, reaching 3.45 hours. This reduction corresponds to 6949 and 1261 hours
respectively in lost flying each year, the equivalent of removing more than 1 aircraft’s
missions from the flight taskings in the unlimited case and over 5 aircraft in the 0 FA
limit case. The last two rows in Table 5 contain performance results of the baseline model
where the numbers in parentheses represent the stock level and reorder point respectively.
For the baseline model, the (1,0) supply case yields only 18.36 daily flying hours while
the (4,2) case achieves 27.94 hours. The chief cause of this difference is attributed to the
(1,0) case waiting for supplies to be delivered as they are only ordered as needed and
only 1 item is held in stock. The ISHM cases all benefit from the prognostic capability of
the ISHM system in ordering supplies to meet requirements.
A typical measure when examining the maintenance demand of an aircraft is
maintenance man hours per flying hour. Figure 8 examines MMH/FH for the case where
all false alarms trigger ISHM system maintenance and the case where FAs in the system
do not incur ISHM maintenance, merely downtime to adjudicate the alarm does not
require maintenance. As shown in Figure 8, the 0 FA limit case MMH/FH increases
linearly as the uncertainty factor increases. This growth results from the number of
maintenance actions on the ISHM system as every FA triggers ISHM maintenance.
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Maintaining the ISHM system takes more time than merely adjudicating a false alarm by
the ISHM system thus the increase in maintenance hours. In the case where FAs do not
trigger ISHM repair, the MMH/FH grow slowly reaching a maximum of 0.268 vs. 4.198
for the 0 FA case. Inspection and maintenance times drive the maintenance hours and if
inspection times were to increase significantly, the number of false alarms shown in
Figure 9 could change the behavior of Figure 8. Additionally, as the uncertainty factor
increases more false alarms occur as shown in Figure 9 as does the resulting downtime
associated with the false alarms observed in Figure 10. For comparison, the baseline
cases have MMH/FH ratios of 0.546 and 0.549 for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases respectively.
In the baseline case, time-based preventive maintenance occurs at set intervals versus the
condition based method employed by CBM driving extra maintenance hours.
Table 5. Average Daily Flying Hours

Uncertainty
0
Factor
2
5
7
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Baseline
Baseline
(1,0)
(4,2)

ISHM False Alarm Limit
0
10000
Mean Daily Flying Hours
35.98
35.98
35.25
35.26
34.90
35.00
34.36
34.92
33.53
34.86
30.14
34.37
27.32
34.10
24.88
33.85
22.96
33.55
21.38
33.25
19.93
33.15
18.92
32.92
17.80
32.62
16.94
32.52
18.36
27.94
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While the MMH/FH numbers are low for an entire aircraft, for a system of
subcomponents when scaled up it is feasible. For example, the U.S. Air Force C-17 fleet
operates around 6 MMH/FH (Nelms, 2008).

Baseline (1,0): 0.546
Baseline (4,2): 0.549

Figure 8. Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour
Figure 9 illustrates the average false alarms per aircraft per year. The quantity
increases from 0 for the 0 uncertainty factor, perfect prognosis, case to 101.52 and 196.65
for the 0 and unlimited FA cases respectively at the 100 uncertainty factor case. As
observed in the figure, since the amount of time spent in maintenance repairing the ISHM
system for every FA in the 0 limit case increases as the uncertainty factor increases the
number of false alarms is lower. It should be noted that this is not a reduction in the FA
rate, as the prognosis accuracy is not degrading over time for this initial investigation.
This mostly results from the maintenance time taking away time when the aircraft could
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be flying and, as noted in Table 5, the mean daily flying hours are nearly double for the
unlimited FA case.

Figure 9. False Alarms per Aircraft per Year
While the number of false alarms per aircraft per year is nearly doubled in the 0
limit case versus the no limit case, FA downtime increases at a considerably higher rate.
As shown in Figure 10, the average downtime each aircraft experiences per year due to
FA increases from 0 for the perfect prognosis case to 111.31 hours for the unlimited FA
case and over 2000 hours for the FA limit 0 case. The increase is attributed to the
additional maintenance required to maintain the ISHM system at the lower FA trigger.
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Figure 10. False Alarm Downtime per Aircraft per Year
Compiling all components of downtime and the number of times the aircraft is
down for maintenance leads to the mean downtime for an occurrence. As shown in
Figure 11, mean downtime decreases from 3.24 hours when the uncertainty prognosis is
perfect to a low 1.09 hours when the uncertainty factor is 100 and FA limit is unlimited.
This decrease is attributed to the fact that while the aircraft is being removed from service
more often to adjudicate false alarms as the uncertainty factor increases, the inspections
do not take as long as the aircraft is quickly returned to operation. MDT for the 0 FA
limit case grows as the uncertainty factor rises, mostly due to all components requiring
inspection and sensor repair for each time down. As uncertainty rises, the aircraft is
brought down more frequently, but more often for a false alarm than maintenance
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actions. Adjudicating a false alarm through inspection takes less time than a repair, thus
the downtime is smaller. For the baseline (1,0) case, MDT is 171.82 hours, and for the
(4,2) case 17.47 hours. The MDT for the (1,0) case is high mainly due to NMCS as there
is only a stock level of 1 LRU and parts are ordered on demand, not schedule. The other
major driver for the baseline MDT is the PM process.

Baseline (1,0): 171.82
Baseline (4,2): 17.47

Figure 11. Mean Downtime
At the low end of the uncertainty factor range, the fixed 10 hour safety factor
imposed on each part accounts for a majority of the lost life each LRU, with the
remainder mostly coming from the component not being able to safely cover the
projected sortie duration. As the uncertainty factor increases, the mean life lost per
component increases as well due to the uncertainty in the RUL prediction necessitating
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replacement before LRU failure. Additionally, the between mission maintenance window
check forwards aircraft for LRU replacement or repair if the RUL prediction is within the
designated maintenance window and parts are in stock. Figure 12 depicts the simulation
outcome described above, growing from 15.63 hours to 35.40 hours for the uncertainty
factor 100 case for each FA limit. Taken over the 15 years, the total life lost ranges from
a low of 144506 hours for the perfect prognostics condition to 321236 hours for the case
where uncertainty factor is 100 and FA limit is unlimited. This translates to 36.67 years
of part life lost for the latter case. The mean life lost for each FA limit case is
approximately equal at each point, thus they are collocated in the figure. This results from
the fact that while the ISHM system may require more maintenance, the LRU
components are only replaced as required. Of note is the max total life lost for the 0 FA
limit case is 207901, occurring at an uncertainty factor of 20. The total life lost then
continues to drop off as the uncertainty factor rises. This is due to the number of hours
being flown by the aircraft declining as the uncertainty factor increases, thus not
requiring LRU replacement as frequently. The lost utilization and cost implications of
this figure could provide justification for system implementation. Component life lost in
the baseline case is driven by the time-based preventive maintenance (PM) cycle. In this
research, the PM cycle is set at 400 hours whereby all components with less than 400
hours remaining, by time accounting, are replaced, yielding a mean life lost of 376.49 and
377.06 hours for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases respectively.
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Baseline (1,0): 376.49
Baseline (4,2): 377.06

Figure 12. Mean Life Lost per Component
False alarms and maintenance hours are important when determining cost, support
requirements, and system confidence, but users, whether they are military or commercial,
want to know how often their aircraft are available and when tasked if they can complete
the mission. Utilizing Eq. (4) to calculate Ao, Figure 13 shows the impact of uncertainty
factor and FA limit. Operational availability drops from 0.983 for both FA limit levels at
an uncertainty factor of 0 to 0.754 for the uncertainty factor 100, FA limit 0 case and
0.969 for the unlimited FA case. The increase in downtime to repair the ISHM system in
the 0 FA limit case is the driving factor in the decrease in Ao over the uncertainty levels.
In the baseline cases, Ao is 0.618 and 0.941 for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases respectively. Ao
is low in the (1,0) case again for the NMCS condition.
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Baseline (1,0): 0.618
Baseline (4,2): 0.941

Figure 13. Operational Availability
Sensor and Prognostic Degradation Results
A further examination of the impact of a degrading prognostics capability is
examined as well. Eq. (2) becomes:

uncertainty  degredation factor  ln( Part RUL)* uncertainty factor

(5)

This degradation factor places an additional uncertainty on the RUL prediction
given as:
 Part ISHM timer 
degredation factor  10  
 *10
 growth factor 

Where growth factor is either 50 or 200 to provide different rates of degradation.
Referring to Table 1, it is shown that component MTBF is bounded between 250 and
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(6)

1000 hours. Therefore, the impact on RUL uncertainty could grow to nearly the
component life in the case of part P if left unchecked. The Part ISHM timer is the
accumulated life on the ISHM components associated with a specific component. The
timer is reset upon component replacement or when a false alarm limit is reached thereby
initiating maintenance on the ISHM system. Degradation factor increases as a function of
the accumulated time on the Part ISHM timer. Thus, the longer the ISHM system is in
operation, the higher the degradation factor becomes adding to the uncertainty in the
system. As with Eqs. (1) and (2), Eqs. (5) and (6) are representative equations developed
by the authors to portray the behavior of health monitoring systems.
Including the degradation factor in the model as in Eq. (5) shows a false alarm
limit may be useful in actual aircraft operation. Fixing the error factor at 20, towards the
lower end of the range, an exploration of the impact of false alarm limits is made. The
growth factors of 50 and 200, utilized in Eq. (6), are hereafter referred to as high and low
respectively. These factors correspond to a growth rate of 20 and 5 per hundred hours of
accumulated time on the ISHM system respectively. The degradation factor adds
additional uncertainty to the RUL prediction to examine the effect of degrading sensor or
prognostics capability through use of the aircraft. In the analysis of degradation factor,
FA limit is the variable of change and is varied from 0 to 100.
Examining the impact of FA limit on mean daily flying hours for the squadron
shows that the 0 FA limit case, for which every false alarm triggers ISHM maintenance,
dramatically reduces the flying hours. This results from the amount of maintenance
required on the ISHM system depleting available hours to fly missions. These results are
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shown in Figure 14 and indicate that the low degradation growth rate reduces the flying
hours from 32.67 at a FA limit of 2 to 31.15 at 100. In contrast, the high growth rate
drops the daily hours from 32.16 at FA limit 2 to 27.49 at FA limit 100. The difference in
the magnitude of the declines lies in the fact that the high degradation rate increases
uncertainty in the RUL prediction, thus driving false alarm occurrence up. That is, when
the FA limit is 0 and there is a false alarm, the ISHM system is always repaired. When
the FA limit increases to 2, this allows flights to continue until 2 false alarms are
incurred, thus allowing increased flying hours for the aircraft. The degradation factor,
slow deterioration of prognostics system, accounts for the remaining decline in daily
flying hours. This results from compounded error in the system increasing as the time
between service lengthens due to the FA limit being raised.
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Baseline (1,0): 18.36
Baseline (4,2): 27.94

Figure 14. Daily Hours Flown
Figure 8 shows that for a static uncertainty factor of 20 the MMH/FH was 0.165
and 0.743 for the FA limit 10000 and 0 cases respectively. Figure 15 below shows that
the high degradation rate reaches 0.74 at a FA limit of 100 and the low rate 0.378. The
graph does not show the FA limit 0 MMH/FH data of 2.361 for the low and 2.468 for the
high to allow better visualization of the remaining data. It is observed in Figure 16 that
the impact of the high growth rate greatly increases the number of false alarms, thus
increasing the maintenance hours required per aircraft flight hour shown in Figure 15.
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Baseline (1,0): 0.546
Baseline (4,2): 0.549

Figure 15. Maintenance Man Hours per Flight Hour
As previously mentioned, Figure 16 is perhaps the best indicator of the impact of
degradation growth rates on aircraft operations. The high growth rate proves true to its
name as the rate of increase in false alarms per aircraft per year remains higher than the
low growth rate over the range of FA limits. The number of false alarms increases as a
result of the degradation factor continually increasing as the ISHM system is not being
maintained at the shorter intervals a lower FA limit brings.
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Figure 16. False Alarms per Aircraft per Year
The impact of the increase in false alarms, and thus downtime, is a decrease in
operational availability, Ao, as the FA limit increases. Shown in Figure 17, the Ao trend
follows that of the daily flying hours and inversely the trends of false alarms and
MMH/FH. Operational availability peaks at a FA limit of 4 for both the high and low
growth rates. The low growth rate levels off around 0.96 at FA limit 60 while the high
rate continues a decline to 0.93 at FA limit 100 without leveling off.
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Baseline (1,0): 0.618
Baseline (4,2): 0.941

Figure 17. Operational Availability
While Figure 16 shows the increased growth in number of false alarms, the true
utility of the model is in determining the “sweet spot” across the performance curves.
This is the location where a peak or trough in the curves indicates performance drops off
on either side and thus this set of factors should be considered for system design. In this
paper, examining Figure 15 and Figure 17 show a performance drop off at a FA limit of
4. These results are specific to the set of inputs used in the model. If the time for
inspection of a failure condition or to repair the ISHM system were changed, the potential
for a different outcome in FA limits exists. Therein lies the utility of the model in being
able to change input characteristics and policies to determine system level performance
metrics.
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In comparing the sensor degradation case in Figure 14 with the baseline case,
daily flying hours remain higher than the baseline case across the FA limit range. The
MMH/FH for the degradation case with low growth rate remains below that of the
baseline cases, while the high growth rate case is higher than the baseline cases for FA
limits above 40. As previously discussed, the FA limit “sweet spot” in this model is 4
thus MMH/FH would be approximately 0.3 and less than the baseline cases. Comparing
Ao between the baseline and degradation models shows that around the 4 FA limit
results, the degradation cases are above 0.96 while the baseline cases are 0.618 and 0.941
for the (1,0) and (4,2) cases respectively. This again shows the ISHM system to provide
higher performance. Finally, the mission reliability for the baseline cases of 84.85% is
higher than the ISHM cases, which are below 70% at the 4 FA limit case. Across the
model metrics the ISHM case with degradation tends towards higher performance than
the baseline. Depending on the desired performance levels desired for the aircraft
program managers are left to weigh the performance metrics.
In the model case where degradation is present, for the uncertainty factor chosen
it is generally best to set the false alarm limit low. Programmatic policy of cost,
availability and reliability will drive towards the selection of a proper limit. Additionally,
changes to degradation factor, i.e., ISHM sensor and prognostic characteristics, and RUL
uncertainty, prediction algorithm accuracy, can change model outcomes. Cost to
implement a certain health monitoring technology on the aircraft may outweigh the
benefit of its inclusion if it drives too many false alarms or too much repair time.
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Absent the cost impacts of manpower and component replacement, the decision as
to how much uncertainty in prognostics is an easier proposition. It is shown in the model
with no degradation that as the RUL uncertainty increases, most performance
characteristics are adversely impacted. The comparison of baseline to ISHM cases shows
the potential advantages implementation of health monitoring and condition based
maintenance. The test for program managers then becomes selecting the appropriate
system characteristics to meet overall aircraft fleet performance and cost metrics.

Conclusion
This research shows employment of an ISHM system supporting CBM can
produce system performance greater than baseline systems. The main contribution of this
effort is as a simulation tool to compare sensing options and examine their impact on
desired performance factors. The ability to input ISHM system and aircraft characteristics
and investigate alternative approaches to monitoring and maintenance makes this tool
useful in program decisions on whether or not to implement monitoring techniques.
While determining causes of system uncertainty is outside the scope of this research,
quantifying the impact of the uncertainty is demonstrated. As a system designer it is
important to note, as this research shows, the amount of uncertainty in your system,
particularly in the prognostics. This uncertainty could be mitigated with better sensors,
techniques or processing algorithms. Further, the designer should seek to minimize either
the number or false alarms the prognostic system produces or set an appropriate limit on
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false alarms to minimize the impact of additional inspection time to adjudicate system
condition.
As cost is not included in this work making a true comparison among options is
difficult. A program manager must weigh the technology costs to achieve the
performance observed in the model and compare those with system objectives. This task
becomes easier if these variables can be explored across a range of scenarios as this
research provides.
Future work in this research will explore the impact of cost, supply factors and
manpower requirements.
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IV. Integrated System Health Monitoring Impact on Non-Repairable Component
Supply Methods

Chapter Overview
From on-board automotive diagnostics to real-time aircraft state of health, the
implementation of health monitoring and management systems are an increasing trend.
This research analyzes the impact of a health monitoring system on a squadron of
aircraft. Flight, maintenance and logistics operations are stochastically modeled to
determine the impact of program decisions on supply metrics. An Arena® discrete event
simulation is utilized to conduct this research on 20 components on each of the 12 aircraft
modeled. Costs and availability are recorded for comparison across three sparing
scenarios to include economic order quantity for baseline and health monitoring cases
and a just-in-time health monitoring set of simulations. Finally, the different
methodologies are compared and discussed as a trade-space for programmatic decisions.

Introduction
The development of vehicle health monitoring systems enables a focus on
condition based maintenance in lieu of time-based preventive maintenance. With
increased knowledge about vehicle systems gained through data collected by health
monitoring systems, logistics operations too should be considered. In (Hess & Fila, 2002;
Hess, Calvello, & Dabney, 2004) Hess et al. discuss the potential benefits of informed
logistic systems enabled by prognostics and health management systems, in particular the
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autonomic logistics information system (ALIS) of the F-35 fighter. With the development
and fielding of health monitoring systems on a range of vehicles, taking full advantage of
the information collected is an evolving task.
Health monitoring efforts can be integrated with the logistics chain to optimize
maintenance actions with supply requirements. The future goal of integrated systems
health management and condition based maintenance (ISHM/CBM) integration is to
yield operations and sustainment (O&S) savings (Carnero Moya, 2004).
The General Accountability Office (GAO) has conducted several audits of the
Department of Defense (DoD), with findings ranging from required items routinely
missing from inventories to enormous on-hand stock. Additionally, they found unneeded
parts on order accounting for billions of dollars in unneeded parts and operational rates
well below goals (Government Accountability Office, 2001; Government Accountability
Office, 2007). Reasons for parts shortages range from inadequate forecasting, repair and
manufacturing issues, poor replacement part reliability, and contracting problems. In one
extreme example, demand for an engine bolt was projected at 828 units when actual
requirements were over 12,000 in a single quarter (Government Accountability Office,
2001). This issue was still present in 2010 when the Logistics Management Institute
conducted a review of DoD logistics citing “inaccurate demand forecasting as a primary
cause for the military services’ inability to align inventory levels with current demands”
(Atchley et al., 2010, p. 2-5). Implementing ISHM/CBM systems on a broad range across
the services would increase the forecasting capability and provide near real time insights
into requirements, both existing and in the near future. Between 2002 and 2005, Air
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Force spares shortages were between 6 and 8 percent of total requirements, averaging
over $1 billion in shortfalls (Government Accountability Office, 2007).
A shortage of spares is not the only issue facing the Air Force. As cited by the
GAO, “the value of Air Force on-order inventory not needed to support required
inventory levels... represent[s] an average of 52% ($1.3 billion) of its on-order inventory”
(Government Accountability Office, 2007, p. 9). Between 2002 and 2005, 65% of onhand inventory—amounting to $18.7 billion—was not required for projected use rates.
Further compounding the unneeded on-hand inventory is that some items have a shelf life
that requires disposal or refurbishment after a set amount of time. The prognostics
capability of ISHM systems can increase the reliability of spares forecasting and,
depending on projected use rates, keep sparing purchases within DoD budget timelines.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant
literature on health monitoring and supply and discusses supply concepts. Section 3
introduces the model formulation and measures of merit. The results for the different
methodologies utilized in this research are provided in Section 4. Finally, section 5
provides a conclusion for the work and discusses future efforts.

Background
This section reviews relevant literature and discusses concepts behind model
formulation.
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Cost Accounting
The cost of ordering replacement parts can be decomposed into two elements,
administrative cost and part cost (Sherbrooke, 2004).

OC  K  P * Q

(7)

where OC is the order cost, K is the fixed administrative cost per order, P is the
component cost, and Q is the order quantity.
Once the ordered spares are delivered to the customer, holding costs are then
accrued. These costs are related to the storage, storage buildings and upkeep, spares
inventorying and maintenance, insurance, etc. These costs are generally calculated as a
percentage of the per unit part cost and are determined either over discrete time periods
or continuously as in Eq. (8). The cost of deterioration is also included in holding cost,
but is not addressed in this research. Shah, Soni, and Patel (Shah, Soni, & Patel, 2013)
propose a method to include the deteriorating spares cost in the holding cost equation.
T

HC  H * SL  t  dt

(8)

0

where HC is the holding cost, H is the part holding cost per time and SL(t) is the stock
level held in inventory at time t (Rodrigues & Yoneyama, 2012).
In the commercial arena, there is a tangible cost for not having needed stock on
hand when required, known as a stockout cost, such as lost revenue for a flight or halting
of production. In the government or military operating environment, where revenue is not
a consideration, the impact is more likely in the form of the system being labeled nonmission capable for supply (NMCS). Depending on the spare parts strategy used for the
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system, a NMCS could result in contractual penalties to suppliers (Anderson, Fitzsimons,
& Simester, 2006; Kennedy, Wayne Patterson, & Fredendall, 2002). Company
reputations as well as relations with customers are also indirect costs of stockout
conditions (Rodrigues & Yoneyama, 2012). Sustained high levels of NMCS aircraft may
also require a larger fleet to meet mission requirements.
Economic Order Quantity
The concept of an optimal or economic order quantity (EOQ) was introduced by
Harris in 1913 (Harris, 1990). Shown in Eq. (9), this model is concerned with a reorder
point, R, and an order quantity, Q, yielding an (R, Q) model. The reorder point is
determined based on the desired safety stock and order lead time. The economic order
quantity is determined by,

Q  2* D * K / H

(9)

where Q is the quantity of spare parts to be purchased when a new order is placed, D is
the average demand per unit of time, K is the administrative cost of placing an order, and
H is the holding cost per unit per unit of time held in inventory (Sherbrooke, 2004).
While a traditional (R, Q) supply methodology augmented by ISHM projections
could work, as shown by Rodriguez and Yoneyama (2012), a just-in-time approach may
work as well.
Prior Models
Kählert, Giljohanan and Klingauf (2014) use a MATLAB discrete event
simulation to analyze a single commercial component with 100% unscheduled
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maintenance. They evaluate health monitoring system performance and conclude a
potential annual savings of approximately 20% is possible.
Rebulanan models the F-35 ALIS system with a discrete event simulation
containing LRUs, communication system, supply, and maintenance systems (Rebulanan,
2000). Rebulanan evaluates model performance with aircraft availability, mission capable
and non-mission capable rates. The simulation shows sensitivity of supply lead time to
the detection lead time and stock levels.
Rodrigues and Yoneyama (2012; 2013) examine the impact of ISHM prognostics
on stock levels for both repairable and non-repairable systems. These models are
compared with a conventional supply system. These studies both indicate potential cost
savings for a prognostic system versus a conventional supply process. The non-repairable
study includes only one item with a fixed supply lead time. This limitation leaves the
interaction of multiple components and variable lead times in question.

Methodology
The research methodology used in this work builds upon Vandawaker, Jacques,
and Freels (2015). The Arena® discrete event simulation processes a squadron of 12
aircraft through daily operations to include: flying, take-offs and landings, inspections,
maintenance, supply and health monitoring activities. Each simulation takes the aircraft
through 15 years of operation and consists of 100 runs. The architecture for the ISHM
model processes is found in Figure 6. This figure depicts the flow of information and
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aircraft through system operations. System processes include flight operations, ISHM
diagnostics and prognostics, CBM order processing, and maintenance and supply actions.

Figure 18. ISHM System Architecture
A baseline model is run as a comparison with time-based preventive maintenance
and (R, Q) stocking policy. An ISHM model is also run with an (R, Q) policy based on
Rodrigues and Yoneyama (2012) where the reorder point is adjusted based on need
predicted by the ISHM system. These are both compared to a supply system operating
nearer to a just-in-time delivery program.
Just-in-Time Logistics
Hess and Fila ( 2002) discuss the ability of health monitoring systems and
automated logistics to enable just-in-time (JIT) inventory methods. There are, however,
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conflicting views regarding the efficacy of just-in-time sparing. Bragalia, Grassi, and
Montanari ( 2004) cite just-in-time sparing as “the most desirable approach,” but stress
good integration between supplier and customer. Kennedy, Patterson, and Fredendall
(2002) cite JIT sparing as a desirable option for predictable demand items, while also
stating that JIT may not be a good option when demand is unpredictable. Huiskonen
(2001) also suggests a strong relationship between the supplier and customer is necessary
to ensure efficient and effective inventory management if JIT parts management is
chosen.
In this work, ensuring adequate notification time prior to component need is
accomplished through a daily analysis of projected component needs. This lead time is
shown in Eq. (10) and includes factors to mitigate the risk of a stockout condition prior to
component need by maintenance,

SF  MW  JIT factor  Part _ RUL
where SF is the component safety factor, MW is the maintenance window to make
preemptive repairs, JIT factor accounts for supply lead time, and Part_RUL is the
remaining useful life of the part in question.
This research used the methodology above for just-in-time supply with order
windows of 1, 3 and 5 days across the simulation runs.
The modeling assumptions for this work are as follows:


Components are non-repairable;



Components do not degrade on shelf;



Cost of money is constant across simulation time;



No change in delivery time distribution over simulation;
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(10)



No cost penalty for backorder;



Cost of supplies remains constant;



There is no discount for large quantity order;



(R, Q) model unique for each part;



If a stockout condition occurs before order is received, aircraft is NMCS until
part(s) arrive;



Each order incurs a fixed administrative cost, K, regardless of ordering
process;



A holding cost, HC, is incurred annually for each unit in inventory;



Enough maintenance personnel are available to complete tasks without delay.

Model Components and Architecture
Each aircraft has 20 components, denoted A-T, with failure times randomly
sampled from an exponential distribution, with a given mean time between failure
(MTBF), and with probability distribution function: f ( x) 

1

e

 x

, for x  0 .

In the baseline case, unless the part is scheduled for preventive maintenance, the
condition is not known; thus the need for repair or replacement is unanticipated and the
aircraft continues normal mission operations. Maintenance actions are performed in
parallel on each aircraft. All part inspection times are in minutes and are triangularly
distributed (20, 30, 45). LRU replacement times are also in minutes and triangularly
distributed (60, 90, 240).
Supplies are input into the model at an initial stock level and a reorder point. In
the baseline case, the reorder point and economic order quantity are fixed throughout the
simulation. The baseline reorder point is two for all components, leaving a small safety
stock to lessen the probability of running out of spares before the next need. In the ISHM
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EOQ case, the order quantity, Q, is fixed, but the reorder point, R, varies based on
predicted need from the ISHM system prognostics. In the just-in-time cases, an initial
stock level of five is assigned and the ISHM prognostics decide when and what quantities
of parts are ordered. The ordering system for the just-in-time cases scans all aircraft daily
and determines the required number of each component over a certain lead time to need,
shown in Eq. (10), and orders are made at a set interval of days to meet the demand. EOQ
is not considered in the just-in-time cases. Supply lead time is log-normally distributed
(5, 2) days between delivery and receipt for all parts.
The remaining useful life (RUL) prognostic technique used in this research takes
into account sensor degradation and inherent uncertainty in the system as described in
Vandawaker (Vandawaker, Jacques, & Freels, 2015). The health monitoring system
orders spares to meet demand as described in section 2. If a component is in a stockout
condition, the aircraft becomes non-mission capable for supply awaiting needed part(s).
Evaluation Parameters
Two categories of metrics are applicable to the results of this research: availability
and cost.
Operational availability (AO) includes logistics, supply and administrative delays
to preventive and corrective maintenance for the system resulting in the mean downtime
for the system. Operational availability is the system availability the user of a system
realizes (ReliaSoft, 2007). Mathematically, operational availability is:

Ao 

Uptime
MTBM

Uptime  Downtime MTBM  MMT  MLDT
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(11)

Where: MTBM is the mean time between maintenance, MLDT is the mean logistics
delay time, and MMT is the mean maintenance time.
Non-mission capable supply (NMCS) is the time between component need by
maintenance and when the part arrives in maintenance. ISHM/CBM’s prognostic ability
can predict impending component failure and establish sparing requirements in advance
of maintenance requirements, ordering spares if stock levels are inadequate. The baseline
process relies on predicted failure rates and providing stock levels to meet anticipated
demands. This process increases the logistic footprint by requiring storage facilities for
materiel that may not be needed for upwards of a year. Managing these spares and the
facility requires additional resources, manpower, and money. Holding cost is another area
of interest as it drives facility and manpower requirements.

Results
The data presented here shows the impacts of part ordering based on projected
need of all aircraft over the duration in Eq. (10). Additionally, EOQ models with both
ISHM and baseline architectures are provided for comparison.
Figure 19 shows the impact of the supply ordering methodology. It is observed
that as the number of days between JIT orders increases, the yearly average NMCS hours
per aircraft increases as well. The increase is attributed to variability in aircraft usage and
supply delivery time over the period between ordering and actual receipt of the parts. The
baseline case with a (R, Q) ordering scheme for spare parts yields a yearly NMCS rate
per aircraft of 57 hours. This baseline result represents a 26% lower rate than ordering
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parts every 5 days, but a 90% increase over the 3 day ordering schedule and an 850%
increase over daily ordering. Notably, the ISHM EOQ case has the lowest annual mean
NMCS time, less than 4 hours per aircraft. The high supply availability is attributed to the
on-hand stock kept versus the JIT method and the forward looking capability afforded by
the ISHM prognostics.

Figure 19. NMCS Hours per Aircraft per Year
While it may be desirable to choose a methodology with the lowest NMCS rate, it
does not come without an accompanying cost. Shown in Figure 20 below, increased
holding cost is a trade-off of a low NMCS rate. Holding cost decreases as the order
frequency increases. This increase is a direct result of spares being in stock for a longer
duration awaiting installation on the aircraft. In the baseline case, mean yearly holding
costs are $106K. As shown in Figure 20, this represents a 104% increase over daily
ordering, a 171% increase over 3 day order frequency, and a 216% increase over 5 day
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ordering. While the holding costs may not appear to be a large value in absolute terms, it
must be noted that these costs are only for 20 components in a fleet of 12 aircraft at one
operating location. When scaled up to thousands of parts and hundreds of aircraft, and
operating at locations around the world, these costs can be sizeable.

Figure 20. Holding Cost
As discussed in section 2, administrative order costs are those costs associated
with the processing, shipping and handling of an order above the cost for the actual
part(s). As shown in Figure 21, the administrative costs for the just-in-time delivery
method are considerably higher than for the EOQ schemes for both the baseline and
ISHM cases. This results from the fact that orders are being placed much more frequently
to meet demand as the stock level for the JIT case is kept to only what is projected over
the next several days of flying. The EOQ cases take into account economic factors of the
supply process to keep overall cost low, at a higher overall holding cost and stock level.
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If JIT administrative costs can be brought down through contracts or arrangements with
suppliers, then the JIT system could be more competitive with the EOQ ordering scheme.

Figure 21. Administrative Cost
Figure 22 represents the total annual supply cost for each scenario; this includes,
holding costs, administrative costs, and part costs. Observed in Figure 21, administrative
ordering costs account for the majority of the total supply cost differences. While the
baseline cost has the smallest annual cost, it is only part of the picture. When
maintenance costs are included in Figure 23, the baseline case is no longer the lowest
cost. Further, when considering Figure 24 and Figure 25, the baseline case has the lowest
operational availably and six fewer daily flying hours across the 12 aircraft. Six flying
hours per day is equivalent to requiring two fewer aircraft in the ISHM cases for
comparison.
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Figure 22. Total Supply Cost
Summing total supply costs along with the direct maintenance costs, actual
maintenance personnel inspecting or replacing parts on aircraft, yields the total cost
shown in Figure 23. This comparison shows a spread of approximately $500,000
annually across the model cases. It is noted that the maintenance cost for the baseline
case is 2.5 times higher, resulting from fixed timed based preventive replacement versus
the condition based replacement under the ISHM logic.
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Figure 23. Total Cost
Operational availability is of concern for most systems, and aircraft are no
exception, whether commercial carriers or military transports. If aircraft aren’t available,
the mission either doesn’t get accomplished or it is delayed, costing money and/or
reputation. Figure 24 shows the impact of the supply methodologies in this research. The
baseline case shows the lowest operational availability resulting primarily, as mentioned
above, from additional time-based maintenance and inspections. Ao for the ISHM cases
remain between 0.97 and 0.98 for all the scenarios, resulting from fewer required
maintenance activities. Fewer maintenance activities also means more time to conduct
flying operations. Shown in Figure 25, the daily flying hours for the ISHM cases are
higher than for the baseline case.
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Figure 24. Operational Availability
While cost is a chief consideration of the operation of most systems, it is not the
only concern or measure of merit. Selection of any system requires a balance among
often competing objectives. In this research, cost and availability or flying hours are
somewhat diametric parameters. While supply costs for all ISHM cases are higher than
the baseline, it is not the only consideration. Management must weigh the savings
potential for the supply methodology chosen with the need fewer aircraft to accomplish
the same mission. So while status quo of the baseline system shows a savings of 17%
annually, the ISHM cases can provide better Ao and equivalent flying hours with two
fewer aircraft. If the cost savings of removing two aircraft and the cost to instrument and
implement ISHM across the remaining aircraft is less than the baseline case, the
economic case is made to implement ISHM. Additionally, if the two additional aircraft

102

are kept as well, new missions could be accepted to increase productivity and usefulness
of the systems.

Figure 25. Daily Flying Hours
Conclusion
This model is meant as a planning and design tool to study the impact of ISHM
capabilities, maintenance processes, and spares management considerations. Weighing
the impacts of simulation outputs and management philosophies with cost and
performance objectives is left to program managers to determine the appropriate level of
service required.
The cases laid out above provide an example of the capability of integrated
system health management enabling condition based maintenance to provide a
competitive cost to traditional aircraft operations. The tool developed by the authors
provides insight into the trade-space of health monitoring requirements, sparing decisions
and maintenance operations. If the administrative cost of just-in-time sparing can be
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reduced, it is possible to compete with a modified economic order quantity sparing
system. Additionally, these are fictional cases and as discussed by numerous authors, the
truth likely lies somewhere in between (Braglia et al., 2004; Carnero Moya, 2004;
Huiskonen, 2001; Kennedy et al., 2002; Wheatley, Gzara, & Jewkes, 2015).
The results of this research show that switching from a baseline EOQ system to
and ISHM EOQ system can provide cost savings, absent the initial investment of the
health management system. The tool and simulation outputs are then useful in
determining if the long-term performance increases of the ISHM system balance out the
additional upfront cost of implementation.
The next step in this research is a study of maintenance manning decisions based
on health monitoring inputs. Further study of this area of interest should also include
repairable systems and their impact on the supply chain and manning.
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V. An Examination of System Health Monitoring Impact Non-Repairable
Component Maintenance Manning

Chapter Overview
Reductions in operating budgets are forcing many companies and militaries to
consider reducing manpower, in particular maintenance personnel. Combined with longer
service lives for aircraft and other systems, maintenance and operations processes must
be reconsidered. One research and development method to support the above
considerations is health monitoring systems. The majority of published research efforts
focus on health monitoring techniques and technologies, leaving others to determine the
maintenance and logistics impact on the systems. This research utilizes an Arena®
discrete event simulation to examine a squadron of 12 military cargo aircraft, monitoring
20 components on each, equipped with health monitoring systems. The impact of health
monitoring on maintenance manning decisions and system performance is studied. Data
presented for numerous manning levels show potential cost and performance trade-offs.
Additionally, a case study exploring the impact of two limited manning levels is
presented. The value of this work is in showing the ability of health monitoring systems
to affect condition based maintenance decisions. Additionally, the development of tradespaces within operating environments is demonstrated along with the ability to conduct
cost benefit analyses.
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Introduction
Maintenance has evolved over time from a “fix it when it breaks” policy towards
the increasingly popular condition based maintenance programs. Rising costs, longer
service lives and reduced manpower has driven a proactive approach to maintaining
systems. The reactive or corrective maintenance approach of many systems forces either
a costly spares stockpile to prepare for all possible failures or waiting for replacement
parts to arrive resulting in zero operational availability (Amari et al., 2006). One of the
first advancements in maintenance practice was to establish regular inspection and
preventive maintenance (PM) intervals. This technique analyzed various forms of system
performance data to determine appropriate times to inspect and replace components
(Walls et al., 1999). This PM approach benefits in reduced catastrophic failures at the
expense of more maintenance cycles and higher maintenance cost (Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, May, 2008). Unanticipated
failures still occur outside the preprogrammed maintenance windows and must be taken
into account. Further, PM subjects the system to unnecessary “repair” based on the
required schedule for the system. The unneeded maintenance adds extra expense to the
system since the component may have had remaining useful life. Moreover, the
probability of failure can increase as damage often occurs during maintenance actions.
Another approach to system maintenance is the concept of selective maintenance,
whereby a subset of actions are performed from a group of proposed maintenance tasks
(Iyoob et al., 2006). As Iyoob, Cassady, and Pohl (2006) point out, a majority of studies
into maintenance practices ignore budget limitations, manpower or time constraints,
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which is where selective maintenance can assist in determining what actions should be
taken to maximize the available resources. They present logic for determining
maintenance actions when “it may be impossible to make all possible repairs before the
next mission.” The selective maintenance process can affect all maintenance approaches,
but repair driven by material state afforded by condition based maintenance (CBM)
allows for the management of downtime and resources. CBM and other predictive
maintenance programs have further evolved from preventive strategies to actively or
passively analyzing system health and forecasting remaining life.
Much research on health monitoring systems is focused on obtaining system or
component states of health and predicting remaining useful life (RUL). These works
generally provide estimates of savings in maintenance based upon the ability to utilize
parts longer before replacement or through the elimination or reduction of inspections to
determine materiel condition:


40% for vehicle maintenance (Walls et al., 1999)



30% to 50% for fuselage panels (Pattabhiraman et al., 2010)



10% electrical components (Scanff et al., 2007)



50-80% for the Boeing 777 (Gorinevsky et al., 2005).
Lacking in these studies is the impact an integrated system health management

(ISHM) approach could have on maintenance manning decisions. If inspections are no
longer needed or occur on a less frequent basis, are the personnel devoted to time-based
inspections and repair needed at all? What needs to be addressed to fully understand the
impact of these works are potential savings through a reduction or realignment of
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maintenance manpower. This paper lays out a study of the implications of integrated
systems health management on maintenance manning levels and the associated cost and
aircraft availability impacts.

Background
Condition based maintenance, when appropriately applied, can reduce the life
cycle cost of a system. Ellis (2008) argues that cost-effective systems monitoring allows
repair actions based on system condition rather than costly time-based maintenance.
Additionally, maintenance can be forecast for completion at a time, likely between
projected flying sorties, that minimizes impact on the operational mission of the system.
Under a CBM paradigm, interim time-based inspections, required under the baseline PM
approach are forgone in lieu of a continuous analysis of the aircraft via the ISHM system.
Maintenance Manning
While this work does not propose a new technique to optimize maintenance
manning, it does seek to utilize tools and modeling to show the impact of a health
monitoring system on maintenance activities. That said a review of relevant maintenance
optimization and planning literature is still insightful.
Sherif (1982) provides a good review of over 800 articles in which he defines
eight aspects of reliability and maintainability that methods fall under. Additionally,
Sherif surmises that system design and evaluation must consider both availability and
performance criteria to meet the goal of maximizing profit and availability while
minimizing cost. Most research however, deals with failing systems and neglects the
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prognostics capability of ISHM based systems driving CBM (Scarf, 1997) (Huynh,
Barros, & Bérenguer, 2012)(Khac Tuan Huynh, Barros, & Berenguer, 2012). Chilcott
and Christer (1991) provide an examination of the impact of CBM on manning in coal
operations assuming perfect diagnostic capabilities in the health monitoring system.
Further, Chilcott and Christer find that even small downtime savings can provide large
financial benefits. Mahulkar et al. (2009) present a study of manning based on a system
of systems in a naval environment that while not specifically focused on condition based
maintenance, does include the principles of actions based on component or system states.
Their study showed intelligent maintenance, i.e., sensor systems, can reduce maintenance
manning requirements and increase efficiency.
Dekker (1996) points out that while a number of mathematical approaches have
been proposed to approach maintenance optimization, none are as straight forward as the
economic order quantity methods used in supply optimization. He goes on to say that
most maintenance problems require software and models to predict gains in maintenance
methods and it becomes more of an art than a pure science. The key then becomes
adequately and accurately measuring the model outputs to gain insight into the
methodology.
Maintenance Metrics
In order to properly measure system and model performance, metrics must be
established and defined across the range of model outputs. First, non-mission capable for
maintenance (NMCM) is an aircraft state where the vehicle is operationally incapable due
to maintenance requirements. The maintenance man-hours per flying hour (MMH/FH)
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metric measures the effectiveness of maintenance personnel and the ease with which a
system can be repaired. Another key metric in determining maintenance efficacy is the
mean time to repair (MTTR) a system, that is, the total maintenance elapsed time divided
by the number of maintenance actions (Defense Acquisition University, 2012).
(12)
Operational availability (AO) is defined as the system availability the user of a
system realizes (ReliaSoft, 2007). Mathematically, operational availability is given as:

Ao 

Uptime
MTBM

Uptime  Downtime MTBM  MMT  MLDT

(13)

Where MTBM is the mean time between maintenance, MMT is the mean maintenance
time, and MLDT is the mean logistics delay time. For the purposes of this research,
MMT and MTTR are assumed to be equivalent.

Methodology
Utilizing the military aircraft model developed in (Vandawaker, Jacques, &
Freels, 2015) and (Vandawaker, Jacques, Ryan, Huscroft, & Freels, 2015) by
Vandawaker et al., this research explores the impact of health monitoring systems on
maintenance manning. They compare a baseline squadron of aircraft, no ISHM, with the
same squadron with ISHM implemented, examining false alarms and availability impacts
in addition to cost. Further, they explore the impact of ISHM on economic order quantity
and just-in-time supply methods. The just-in-time supply methodology from
(Vandawaker, Jacques, Ryan et al., 2015) is utilized for stocking components in this
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research. These works compared ISHM systems to baseline systems to show possible
gains through the use of health monitoring technology. This research extends the
previous modeling approach to study the impact of maintenance manning levels on a
system equipped with health monitoring systems. The time-based inspections and
preventive maintenance in a baseline or non-ISHM equipped aircraft are replaced with
computer scans of sensor data which are then used to predict RUL and forecast
maintenance.
This work does not attempt to optimize maintenance manning, but to show the
impact of an ISHM equipped aircraft squadron on manning levels. The effect of
maintenance personnel levels on system performance is only observed in relation to the
direct maintenance on the 20 unique components modeled on each of 12 aircraft in this
work. This information allows planners to determine the maintenance requirements and
allocation of personnel, or fractions thereof, to the direct support of the researched parts.
For each of the twenty components it is assumed that the time between successive
failures follows an exponential distribution.
The ISHM system produces prognostics for RUL based upon its calculations from
system diagnostics. There are two components in the RUL, diagnosis from the health
monitoring system and prediction uncertainty. In this research component diagnostics is
taken as perfect, i.e., sensor always knows exact health. With many health monitoring
techniques, the closer a component is to failure, the better uncertainty can be quantified
for the diagnosis of condition (S. Sankararaman & Goebel, 2013). This leads to the line
replaceable unit (LRU) RUL given as:
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LRU RUL  lognormal(Diagnosis, uncertainty)

(14)

Where Diagnosis is equivalent to the true remaining life and uncertainty is defined in Eq.
(15).

uncertainty  degredation factor  ln( Part RUL)* uncertainty factor

(15)

where Part RUL is the previous RUL prediction for that part and, uncertainty factor is a
design variable. The degradation factor places an additional uncertainty on the RUL
prediction given as:

degredation factor  10  Part ISHM timer / 20

(16)

Where, Part ISHM timer is the accumulated life on the health monitoring
component associated with a specific component. The leading 10 in the equation
represents a fixed initial degradation while the 20 provides a representative increase in
degradation as life, or wear, incurs on each part respectively. As shown above,
degradation factor increases in direct relation to the accumulated Part ISHM time. The
effect of the degradation factor on RUL uncertainty is a gradual increase in the
accumulated uncertainty for a particular component. When a component is replaced or
reaches a limit in the number of false alarms, thus triggering ISHM maintenance, the
ISHM part timer is reset (Vandawaker, Jacques, & Freels, 2015).
In this research, components are non-repairable, that is, they are replaced upon
failure or an indication from the ISHM system. Upon indication of impending failure by
the health monitoring system, the aircraft is brought into maintenance for inspection to
adjudicate if the indication is real or a false alarm. The times to complete an inspection
for all components are triangularly distributed (20, 30, 45) minutes. If the inspection
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confirms the ISHM prognostics the component is then replaced along with others deemed
in need of repair. The time to replace each line replaceable unit (LRU) replacements are
triangularly distributed (60, 90, 240) minutes if only 1 maintainer is available for the
action and triangularly distributed (40, 60, 160) minutes if 2 personnel are on the task.
These parameters values were chosen to represent a range of repairs and inspections.
Additionally, if multiple components require replacement or inspection, the tasks can be
completed in parallel, if sufficient personnel are available.
In addition to components being replaced upon immediate need, maintenance may
also occur to make use of time between missions. At the end of a mission the ISHM
system scans the aircraft. If the ISHM system indicates maintenance is required within a
predefined maintenance window and the projected time to complete the component
replacement(s) is less than the time before the next mission, the aircraft is brought in for
maintenance. Further, if an aircraft is already in for maintenance and the ISHM system
indicates other components are not in need of immediate replacement, but within the
maintenance window, those components can be replaced if there is adequate stock.
When maintenance actions are performed, they are arranged to take advantage of
available personnel to complete all processes in the quickest manner. Depending on the
number of replacements required on a particular aircraft, these tasks may be performed in
parallel, serially, or some combination of the two utilizing the times discussed earlier in
this section.
Maintenance personnel are assigned to one of two 12 hour shift manning levels:
day, 7AM to 7PM; and night, 7PM to 7AM. Various combinations of day and night shift
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manning levels are explored in this work, ranging from 1 day and 0 night shift personnel
to 20 maintainers on both day and night shift. The 20 maintainer case provides enough
personnel that no wait time for inspection or repair is observed.
The modeling assumptions for this work are as follows:


Aircraft missions occur around the clock regardless of maintenance manning;



Aircraft are either fully mission capable (FMC) or non-mission capable
(NMC) with no partial mission capability (PMC).

Results
Reflected in this section are the results of manning variations across model runs.
The figures herein represent the two shift manning levels from section 3. The upper row
of the x-axis in the figures contains the number of personnel available for tasks on the
day shift and the lower row includes those available for actions on the night shift. The
results shown below are the mean of 100 model simulations at each personnel
combination. The analysis for statistical significance was performed; however,
confidence intervals are not presented in the figures in this work. The reason for
confidence intervals not being presented is that 95% intervals shown in the figures are
indistinguishable from the mean of the data, which are shown.
Model Output
Operational availability is a common measure of system performance. The AO’s
observed in Figure 20 reflect the availability of the squadron of 12 aircraft over the
duration of a 15 year simulation. The addition of one maintainer to the night shift is
shown to have an appreciable impact on overall system performance, as is shown further
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in the remaining figures. For the condition where only 1 maintainer is available on the
day shift and none on the night shift, AO is slightly above 0.90. The addition of one
person on the night shift to provide service increases the AO to over 0.96, meaning the
aircraft are available for mission tasking an additional 6% of the time. As shown in
Figure 27, that 6% represents an additional 4.5 hours of flying time per day across the 12
aircraft or nearly the equivalent of adding 2 more aircraft to the squadron.
Figure 20 also shows that adding 1 additional person to the day shift for a total of
2 provides a benefit worthy of consideration by management. The addition of other
personnel on both day and night shifts continues to have positive impacts on the
operational availability but with smaller increase in magnitude. Beyond the inclusion of 2
personnel on the night shift, AO gains are in the thousandths and when factoring in the
remaining metrics may not sway management decisions. The largest gains noted in
Figure 20 are the result of the aircraft not having to wait up to 12 hours over the night
shift for maintenance which occurs in the step from 0 to 1 night shift maintainer. Other
gains result from the ability to complete more component replacements simultaneously as
more personnel are available.
While the AO may appear high for many aircraft, it should be noted that these
results only include the impact from 20 components on the 12 aircraft. This note should
also be considered in reviewing the remainder of the data and figures presented in this
research.
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Figure 26. Operational Availability
Daily flying hours for the 12 aircraft squadron, shown in Figure 27, reflect that
the inclusion of just 1 maintainer on the night shift has the effect of increasing daily
output by over 3 hours. As previously mentioned, this is the equivalent of adding another
mission to the daily flying schedule for the cost of one maintainer. Further gains in daily
sortie production with increasing numbers of personnel, both day and night shift, are
smaller and left to operations and maintenance management to determine the efficacy of
including the extra manpower.
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Figure 27. Daily Flying Hours
Alluded to in previous discussion, the amount of time annually the squadron is
NMCM generally decreases as the number of personnel increases as observed in Figure
28. The addition of one maintainer to the night shift drops the mean NMCM from 10200
hours to 3400 for the 1 maintainer on the day shift case. The nearly 7000 hours less time
down for maintenance affords increased opportunities for aircraft missions as well as
lower workloads for the individual maintenance personnel. Greater gains can also be
realized with the inclusion of more personnel on the day shift, but plateaus as the NMCM
time becomes mostly hands-on maintenance with little to no awaiting maintenance time.
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Figure 28. Annual NMCM Hours
Exploring the efficacy of maintenance manning from a different vantage than
NMCM, Figure 29 shows the average time an aircraft has to wait prior to a maintenance
action beginning. In other words, Figure 29 represents the responsiveness of the
maintenance system to aircraft demands. If supply wait time were added to these data, the
result would be the MLDT from Eq (1). The shape of Figure 29 follows that of Figure 28
with the magnitude reflecting total waiting time for all maintenance actions divided by
the number of total actions. The figure clearly shows the impact of the addition of a night
shift maintainer on the wait time for maintenance to begin, bringing the average wait time
from over 5.5 hours to 32 minutes. Once night shift personnel are increased to 2 or more,
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the average wait time is less than 6 minutes for all cases. The 8 day and 8 night case wait
time is 2 seconds and 20 day, 20 night is 0.

Figure 29. Mean Time Waiting for Maintenance
The addition of repair time to Figure 29 yields the maintenance metric of MTTR
found in Figure 30. Again it is noted that the elimination of a 12 hour period where no
personnel are available to perform maintenance is beneficial to aircraft turn-around time
from maintenance. While Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30 depict similar information,
they each provide insight into the timeliness of the maintenance system in its ability to
support aircraft operations.
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As in Figure 29, Figure 30 shows an area of little variation for cases where 2 or
more personnel are available on the night shift. The resulting MTTRs for these cases are
predominately true labor hours as maintainers are available to perform most tasks as they
arise.

Figure 30. Mean Time to Repair
Figure 31 shows the utilization rate for the maintenance personnel assigned to
each simulation. The first column shows that with only 1 person on day shift and none on
the night shift, the maintainer is busy 50% of the available hours. While that may not
appear to be overtaxing on the individual, that person must perform all repairs and
inspections as required. While the forward looking prognostics of the ISHM system can
allow for deconflicting of component replacement, failure warnings must still be
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adjudicated through inspections which can lead to backups in the maintenance process,
noted in Figure 29.

Figure 31. Personnel Utilization
The doubling of day shift personnel to 2 while keeping the night shift at 0 results
in a 46% drop in utilization rate. The trend in Figure 31 shows that adding personnel on
the dayshift steeply drops the utilization rate while including additional night shift
personnel changes the magnitude of the group rates. Examining the 20 day and 20 night
case, utilization rate drops to 0.02, leaving those personnel 98% of their time to focus on
other tasks.
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The usefulness of Figure 31 lies in being able to manage workload for
maintenance personnel. As this model only represent 20 components there are likely
other tasks maintainers are responsible for accomplishing. If it is shown that, in the case
of only 1 day worker and 0 night, a maintainer will need to focus 50% of their shift, or 6
hours, to these components scheduling other work becomes more difficult.
The amount of maintenance required for a flying hour is an indication of
efficiency of maintenance processes and the reparability of the aircraft. Figure 32 shows
MMH/FH remains between 0.2 and 0.25. While MMH/FH doesn’t show much variation,
the entire picture is not clear from this one figure. Total maintenance man hours are lower
for the cases with no night shift personnel, but referring to Figure 27 it is also noted that
flying hours are lower as well. The driving case for a relatively stable MMH/FH results
from the repair times in section 3, which do not vary across the manning scenarios. It
follows then that as the cases with night shift personnel have more flying hours the
maintenance hours increase accordingly, keeping the MMH/FH ratio similar. Within the
night shift bands, MMH/FH variation is noted with different day shift personnel numbers.
When observing Figure 20 and Figure 27 in relation to Figure 32, the incremental gains
in Ao and daily hours track within the night shift bands.
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Figure 32. Maintenance Man Hours per Flying Hour
Turning to the costs associated with the maintenance of the 20 components of
interest in this research, Figure 33 shows the annual cost of direct maintenance. These
figures only include the time maintenance personnel are actively inspecting components
to determine if failure indications are true or are in the process of replacing items on the
aircraft. An hourly maintenance cost of $50 is used for all personnel (Department of the
Air Force, February 1994). The annual cost of maintenance peaks at $155K for the 8 day,
8 night personnel case and is slightly lower for the 20, 20 case, due to the efficiency of
having more personnel to complete tasks. The lower cost of the 1 day and 0 night case
belies the fact that the operational output is markedly lower, as shown in Figure 20 and
Figure 27.
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Figure 33. Annual Maintenance Cost
Shifting focus to total logistics and maintenance cost in Figure 34, it is clear that
the direct maintenance costs are but a small portion of the overall price tag. Except in the
cases where no night shift personnel are scheduled, maintenance costs are less than 7% of
the total logistics and maintenance cost. The percentage rises to between 14% and 21% of
the total cost when no night shift personnel are available. The remainder of this cost is the
purchase and storage of spare parts for aircraft operation.

124

Figure 34. Annual Logistics and Maintenance Cost
Case Study
Let us explore the data in section 4.1 from a maintenance management
perspective. If a decision had to be made where only 2 personnel were available for
maintenance on the 20 components studied which shift combination is preferred: 2 day
and 0 night; or 1 day and 1 night. We will assume that management wants the most
performance, Ao and daily flying hours, for the least cost with other factors considered
for comparison.
Daily flying hours for the (2, 0) case are 29.3 versus 32.7 for the (1, 1) case, with
operational availabilities of 0.93 and 0.96 respectively. With only these two items
considered, management would choose the (1, 1) case as better performance is achieved.
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When cost is considered, annual maintenance costs are $10000 larger for the (1, 1) case
or $150000 over the 15 year simulation time with a $230000 total logistics and
maintenance cost difference. The question for management then becomes is this cost
increase justified by the higher system performance?
The likely answer to the previous question is yes as the system performance gain
of the (1, 1) case over the (2, 0) case is equivalent to an additional aircraft worth of flying
time each day. Thus if the cost of an aircraft is higher than $230000 with a planned life of
at least 15 years the higher support costs can be justified. Similarly, an aircraft could be
removed from the (1, 1) case and still achieve performance equivalent to the (2, 0) case.
When additional factors, shown in the remaining figures, are considered, the case
for choosing a (1, 1) maintenance manning scheme becomes greater: 4000 fewer NMCM
hours per year; 190 minutes less wait time for maintenance; 3 hours less MTTR; and a
slightly smaller MMH/FH. The personnel utilization rate of the (1, 1) case is 0.29 versus
0.27 for the (2, 0) case, which could be a positive or negative depending on other
requirements placed on the personnel.
In summary, a management decision based on 2 maintainers would likely yield a
1 day and 1 night shift scheme based on the evidence presented above. Further utility in
this research is offered in determining maintenance workload and the impacts of manning
decisions on overall aircraft system performance. Additionally, the model parameters for
health monitoring capabilities can be changed to determine the downstream effect of
system design on the logistics and maintenance operations. This information can then be
used to provide trade-off analyses to program management.
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Conclusion
The work presented above provides a tool for managers and planners for
utilization in system design and support planning. Information captured in the figures
details cost and performance data that show efficiency in maintenance processes at set
manning levels. The ability to define a trade-space for system parameters early in the
development of an aircraft or any system affords the opportunity to explore future cost
savings and weigh performance trade-offs.
Future work in this model environment should include additional study of
maintenance windowing for when aircraft is already being brought in for other work.
Also, the utilization of remaining useful life prognostics could be enhanced for more
detailed event scheduling for further gains in downtime efficiency and aircraft utilization.
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VII. Component Replacement Windowing

Chapter Overview
This chapter examines the impact of placing a maintenance opportunity timeframe
(window), counting back from the projected component failure time, in the maintenance
logic. This window affords the opportunity for components to be replaced if they fall
within the specified time frame, and the aircraft is already in maintenance for another
replacement or inspection. The data presented herein show there are potential benefits, in
both cost and availability to establishing this type of maintenance window.

Model Description
The parameters used in this chapter are the same as those of chapter 6 with the
addition of the maintenance opportunity introduced above. While getting all useful life
out of a component is desirable, in some instances it may make sense to replace one or
more components earlier than planned. The reasons can be for both availability and cost
savings in the long term as maintaining several components at once is generally more
efficient than replacing them individually. This grouping of maintenance actions saves on
set-up time for repairs as it only has to be done once versus many times for individual
components. The results below illustrate the benefits and drawbacks of a maintenance
window and its effect on cost and availability.
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Results
This work examines results across a range of maintenance manning scenarios
initially, as in chapter 6, to show the effect on operational availability and daily flying
hours. The number of maintenance personnel on the day and night shifts, and the length
(lead time) of the maintenance interval will be varied to examine this effect. The
remainder of the figures show only one manning scenario to focus on the impact of
various levels of maintenance windowing.
Figure 1 depicts the operational availability of the twelve aircraft squadron across
a range of manning scenarios and maintenance windows. It is observed in the figure that
as the number of personnel available increases AO does likewise. Within each manning
band six maintenance windows are also graphed for comparison. The effect of the
maintenance opportunity window on AO shows an increase until 40 hours prior to
projected failure and then a slight reduction at 50 hours. As in chapter 6, the increasing
AO trend across the manning bands is as a result of personnel available to perform repairs
as required instead of aircraft sitting and waiting for inspections or component
replacements. Within each manning band the operational availability increases as the
window increases, until it reaches 50 hours. This AO rise results from seizing the
opportunity to perform maintenance when the aircraft is already down for another action,
thus saving on inspection and set-up time to perform replacements individually. The
leveling off of AO between 30 and 50 hours results from more replacements being
conducted, especially for components that have low MTBFs, which require more
downtime than utilizing a smaller window.
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Figure 35. Maintenance Windowing Operational Availability
Mean daily squadron flying hours, shown in Figure 36, follow the general trends
seen with operational availability. As in the manpower study in chapter 6, daily hours
increase as more personnel are available to maintain the aircraft. Within each manning
band, the effect of maintenance opportunity windowing is noted to increase as the
window hours increase. The gains in daily hours associated with the different windows
result from the opportunity taken to incur fewer times down to make component
replacements in groups versus individually. The reason daily flying hours do not drop off
at the same time operational availability does lies chiefly in the model design. When an
aircraft returns to mission availability following being in maintenance it incurs a hold
prior to its next mission. While this hold time is uptime in terms of AO, flying does not
occur and thus daily hours do not accrue. Shown later in Table 6, false alarms drive the
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number of times aircraft enter maintenance at lower maintenance windows. Once false
alarms are cleared, the aircraft is released back to the hold status until its next mission is
scheduled. Therefore, the more false alarms that occur, the more times an aircraft enters
the mission hold sequence thereby reducing the number of hours the aircraft fly.

Figure 36. Mean Daily Flying Hours
From this point forward the figures and discussions examine the maintenance
manning case with 4 personnel on the day shift and 2 personnel on the night shift. This
case is chosen since overall gains in hours, availability, and costs are relatively low for
the scenarios with additional personnel available.
One of the goals of grouping maintenance activities is to reduce the total number
of hours the aircraft are down and unavailable for operations. Figure 37 shows the mean
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annual NMCM time for each maintenance window. It is observed that as the window size
increases, that is, a greater opportunity to replace a component before its predicted
failure, NMCM hours decline. The decrease is attributed to two items. First, grouping of
component replacements into a single maintenance action in lieu of several maintenance
actions with only one component replaced. Second, as components are replaced more
frequently as the window widens the ISHM system is reset more frequently which leads
to the added benefit of fewer false alarms which require inspections to clear. From
chapters 4 and 6 it is noted that as the sensors accumulate flight hours, they also degrade
which leads to an increase in the number of false alarms. In this scenario, false alarms
decrease from an average of 248 annually to 22 when the maintenance window widens
from 1 to 50 hours. The yearly NMCM hours for a 50 hour window are 52% lower than
at a 1 hour maintenance window and 50% lower than a 10 hour window. Stated another
way, across the 15 year simulation the 50 hour maintenance window provides over 36000
hours more availability as the aircraft are no longer NMCM.
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Figure 37. Mean Annual Non-Mission Capable-Maintenance Hours
The reduction in total NMCM hours with an increasing maintenance window,
made possible by a grouping of maintenance tasks, has a somewhat inverse trend in mean
downtime. As Figure 38 shows, mean downtime increases as the maintenance window
widens. At a 50 hour window, the MDT is more than double that at either 1 or 10 hour
windows. Grouping of component replacements into larger aggregate tasks versus many
individual ones increases the overall time required each time down, but as Figure 37
shows the net effect is lower overall system downtime. While this stands in contrast to
DoD predictions of “significantly reduced” MDTs by performing CBM versus timebased preventive maintenance it does not necessarily contradict the assertion (Under
Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008). Grouping takes advantage of the diagnostic
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and prognostic capabilities provided by ISHM to apply CBM in a more optimal manner
to reduce total aircraft downtime in lieu of many shorter downtimes enabled by the same
ISHM capabilities. The net effect of the grouping of maintenance activities is to increase
the mean downtime while simultaneously reducing total downtime. There is an additional
increase in MDT as a result of a growth in NMCS time as the maintenance window
becomes larger. The NMCS increase results from the supply ordering system, in
particular the supply lead time, not keeping up with the opportunistic maintenance
occurring during the grouping windows.

Figure 38. Mean Downtime
As the maintenance opportunity window widens, a counterpoint is developed in
an increase in the unused useful life for the components. Figure 39 shows the average
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useful life lost across all components. The values are determined by taking the difference
between the accumulated part life at replacement and the actual (not ISHM RUL
projection) failure point assigned to new parts. Major factors that contribute to life lost
include the RUL prediction error, maintenance window, safety factor, projected mission
duration, stock levels, and manning levels among others. Safety factor is fixed at 10
hours for all components and mission durations are LOGNORM (4, 3) hours. These two
components along with error in RUL prognostics account for the majority of part life lost.
The accumulation of the items above leads to the information presented in Figure 39,
which shows that useful life lost increases 142% from a 1 hour window to a 50 hour
window. While it may be desirable from a utility standpoint to get all the useful life
available from a component, it may not be the best financial decision.

Figure 39. Average Life Lost Per Component
135

Examining Figure 40 shows that as the maintenance window increases, supply
costs go up as well. Ideally, costs should be kept as low as possible, but a balance must
be struck between cost, availability, and system performance. Following the trend from
Figure 39, annual supply cost rises as maintenance window increases due to a larger
demand for new components to replace those being removed from service under the
maintenance opportunity window. Obviously, one would expect a correlation, and
causation, between RUL and supply cost. If parts are being replaced more often, more
parts will need to be purchased over the system lifetime. Further exploration of cost
should be considered to develop a trade-space with the parameters discussed above.

Figure 40. Annual Supply Cost
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Figure 41 contains the average annual maintenance costs for the maintenance
opportunity windows. It is noted that the cost of maintenance is considerably lower than
that of spares. Maintenance costs captured are only those directly related to work on the
aircraft performing inspections, replacements, etc. Idle costs and those associated with
training and other duties are not captured in this research. Figure 41 shows that
maintenance costs decrease as the maintenance window increases. This cost decrease
results from the reduced set-up time for grouped maintenance actions versus individual
ones.

Figure 41. Annual Maintenance Cost
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Combining the data from Figure 40 and Figure 41 yields the total annual cost
found in Figure 42. As the maintenance costs are much lower than supply costs, total cost
is dominated by the cost to procure and store parts. Over the 15 year simulation these
annual costs result in a $7.5M difference between the 1 hour maintenance window and
the 50 hour window, with the 50 hour window total cost being $42.3M. As previously
mentioned these costs need to be weighed along with availability data and compared to
program objectives to determine a proper maintenance window.

Figure 42. Total Annual Cost
An examination of the trade-space between AO, total cost, and component life lost
shows the decisions program managers face when selecting a set of maintenance
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parameters. Figure 43 compares annual costs to average component lost life for the 6
maintenance windows utilized. Restating from prior discussion, it is observed that as the
window increases, component life lost and total cost both rise. This figure by itself would
likely drive a decision to select the smallest window, but this does not provide a complete
picture of what is happening system wide.

Figure 43. Annual Cost versus Component Life Lost
Figure 44 provides another component in the trade-space analysis by comparing
operational availability to component life lost. While Figure 43 showed the lowest cost at
the smallest maintenance window, Figure 44 shows it also produces the lowest AO. This
introduces a decision point for management to determine whether the 0.95 AO of the 1
hour window is acceptable or if 0.97 is more desirable. It is noted that these operational
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availabilities are only for the impact of the 20 components studied and not for all aircraft
systems as a whole.

Figure 44. Operational Availability versus Component Life Lost
A final comparison, found in Figure 45, shows operational availability contrasted
with total cost. Utilizing this figure, decisions can be made based upon the cost to achieve
increases in AO for the various maintenance opportunity windows. It is observed that an
increase from 0.95 at the 1 hour window to 0.97 at the 30 hour window will cost an
additional $295K annually or $4.4 M over the 15 year simulation. It is left to
management and program objectives to determine if this trade-off is beneficial to overall
program goals.
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Figure 45. Operational Availability versus Annual Cost
Examining the material reliability metric of MTBF for the aircraft is not possible
for this ISHM research as no component failures are recorded. The design of the ISHM
monitoring logic combined with adjudication of false alarms and recalibration of true
component status capture pending failures before they occur. Additionally, a 10 flight
hour safety factor is included in RUL prognostics thus adding extra margin to component
failure. While MTBF may not be measureable, mean time between maintenance
(MTBM) and mean time between repair/replacement (MTBR) for the aircraft can be
calculated.
Aircraft MTBR is determined by taking accumulated flight hours and dividing by
the number of replacements or groups of replacements to find average time the aircraft as
a whole are available between fixes. Figure 46 shows MTBR times for the maintenance
windows utilized in this work. In this scenario a 20 hour window has the highest MTBR
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by 25 minutes over the 30 hour window. Referring back to Figure 36 it is shown that as
the maintenance window increases daily flying hours do as well. That information,
coupled with Figure 46, must mean that more replacements are occurring since the
MTBR is dropping. This is a logical inference since as more hours are flown, components
will experience a corresponding increase in use thus requiring replacement more often.

Figure 46. Aircraft Mean Time Between Replacement
Aircraft MTBM is the average of the accumulated flight time from when the
aircraft leaves maintenance until it returns for any reason; inspection, false alarm, repair,
etc. Figure 47 shows the aircraft MTBM which increases as the maintenance window
widens. The trend tracks with the inverse of NMCM in Figure 37. As the NMCM
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decreases with increasing window size due primarily to the grouping of maintenance
activities, so does the number of times the aircraft enter maintenance control. This results
in longer durations between inspections and replacements. The added benefit of the more
frequent component replacement with an increasing maintenance window is the reduction
in false alarms. False alarms, at the 1 hour window, dominate the cause of entry into
maintenance, which drives the MTBM down.

Figure 47. Aircraft Mean Time Between Maintenance Action
False alarms drive the number of times aircraft enter maintenance in the smaller
maintenance windows, with the percentage decreasing as the maintenance window
grows. Table 6 shows the relationship between maintenance window, number of times
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entering maintenance, false alarms, and number of times components are replaced The
number of replacements counts either individual component replacements or a group of
component replacements as one action. The number of replacements varies mainly as a
result of the maintenance window and the impact of the window on daily flying hours
shown in Figure 36. False alarms decrease because as components are replaced more
frequently, and further from projected failure, the ISHM sensor and prognostic
degradation does not impact the RUL projection as greatly. The difference in false
alarms, along with their downtime impact on aircraft flying hours, and the effect of
maintenance grouping, accounts for the difference between MTBR and MTBM.
Table 6. Maintenance Actions
Maintenance
Window (hrs)
1
10
20
30
40
50

Times Aircraft
Enter
Maintenance
42303
39739
26257
17713
13511
11697

False Alarm as
Cause
82.6%
83.0%
73.0%
57.2%
40.8%
28.7%

Number of
Replacement
Actions
7378
6757
7077
7576
7999
8344

As shown in Table 6 the percentage of false alarms as the sole cause of an aircraft
entering maintenance is high. There are two means of entry for an aircraft into
maintenance. The first entry case results from an ISHM system indication that a potential
fault exists in one or more of the aircraft components that will violate the safety limit or
fail within the projected flight time. If an aircraft is found to have only false alarms after
inspection, the maintenance opportunity window is not checked and the aircraft is
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released to perform missions. However, if one component triggers a replacement, all
components on the aircraft within the maintenance window then are eligible for
replacement. The second entry case for an aircraft into maintenance occurs post mission
during the hold before the next scheduled flight. A maintenance window check is
performed when an aircraft reaches the post mission hold. If any projected repairs can be
completed prior to the next mission, the aircraft is routed to maintenance for component
replacements. This between mission check provides the chance to capture maintenance
actions during normal standby time for the aircraft prior to the next mission. As the
maintenance window increases, this hold check for potential maintenance actions is
increasingly the cause of aircraft entering maintenance.
Aircraft entering maintenance from the between mission hold check have cleared
the post flight ISHM scan without any indications of potential failures within the safety
window. Since the aircraft from the hold haven’t been sent to maintenance as a result of
immediate need for repair, only sent for opportune maintenance within the maintenance
window, they forgo the inspection and false alarm check and proceed directly for
replacement. This leads to components being replaced further from failure and prior to
triggering most false alarms. There are, however, multiple RUL checks per mission so
this hold maintenance under the maintenance window does not eliminate all false alarms.
Additionally, as the uncertainty grows with sensor life (see Eq. (5)), the potential for false
alarms increases as well.
A parametric analysis was performed with static prognostic uncertainty levels,
without degradation, for the model confirming the increase in false alarms as uncertainty
rises, regardless of maintenance window size. Further, as the uncertainty level and thus
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the standard deviation of the lognormal distribution used for RUL increases, the
probability that the RUL prognostic will predict less than the true remaining life
increases. This shift is a function of the lognormal distribution and the impact its standard
deviation has on skewing the shape of the distribution. As the standard deviation
increases, the mode, or peak, of the distribution shifts to the left and decreases in
magnitude while the right tail decrease more slowly, increasing the probability that the
RUL prediction could be much greater than actual remaining life. Further, analysis of
prognostic uncertainty shows that if the lognormal function is utilized for RUL prediction
uncertainty must be held to a low level in the system. If uncertainty becomes too large,
the system risks cost effectiveness resulting from too many inspections to clear false
alarms and general mistrust by users.
Shown in Table 7 below are the results of the parametric analysis of prognostic
uncertainty. The left two columns, uncertainty and maintenance window, are the
parameters of change in the simulation. The remaining columns are model outputs related
to aircraft entering maintenance and the associated reason for entering. It is noted that as
the uncertainty increases, the percentage of time the only reason an aircraft enters
maintenance is for a false alarm increases considerably. Above an uncertainty level of 10,
the percentage of false alarms is likely unacceptable for a fielded system. Shifting focus
to the maintenance window factor; it is shown in the between mission replacements
column that as the maintenance window increases, the number of times the aircraft enter
maintenance from the hold station increases as well. This results from the widening
window capturing more components, further from actual failure, to replace during this
opportunity.
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Table 7. False Alarm Parametric Analysis
Static
Uncertainty

Maintenance False Alarm
Window
Only Cause
(hrs)
for Entry

Number of
Times Enter
Maintenance

Number of
Maintenance
Actions

Between
Mission
Replacements

False Alarm
Entry
Percentage

1

1

0

8083

8083

0

0.00%

1

10

0

7132

7132

0

0.00%

1

20

0

6436

6436

4578

0.00%

1

30

0

6517

6517

5744

0.00%

1

40

0

6600

6600

6056

0.00%

1

50

0

6771

6771

6280

0.00%

5

1

10

8351

8342

0

0.11%

5

10

9

7635

7626

0

0.12%

5

20

5

6841

6836

3555

0.07%

5

30

2

6659

6657

5481

0.03%

5

40

1

6798

6797

6091

0.01%

5

50

0

6968

6968

6382

0.00%

10

1

1767

10125

8358

0

17.45%

10

10

1706

9596

7891

0

17.77%

10

20

1025

8278

7253

3102

12.39%

10

30

403

7503

7100

5315

5.37%

10

40

144

7321

7177

6213

1.97%

10

50

73

7348

7275

6537

1.00%

20

1

15813

23777

7964

0

66.51%

20

10

15138

22694

7556

0

66.70%

20

20

8820

16075

7254

3338

54.87%

20

30

4202

11614

7412

5418

36.18%

20

40

1968

9537

7569

6366

20.63%

20

50

1073

8815

7742

6814

12.18%

30

1

33200

40783

7582

0

81.41%

30

10

31592

38670

7078

0

81.70%

30

20

18167

25301

7133

3582

71.81%

30

30

9377

16881

7504

5603

55.55%

30

40

4955

12733

7779

6533

38.91%

30

50

3082

11091

8009

6994

27.79%

40

1

47587

54806

7219

0

86.83%

40

10

44897

51599

6702

0

87.01%

40

20

26385

33407

7021

3653

78.98%

40

30

14280

21768

7488

5645

65.60%

40

40

8109

15949

7840

6585

50.84%

40

50

5458

13594

8136

7064

40.15%
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Statistical Significance
An analysis for statistical significance was performed; however, confidence
intervals are not presented in the figures in this work. The reason for confidence intervals
not being presented is that 95% intervals shown in the figures are not distinguishable
from the mean of the data, which are shown. This holds true for the entirety of this
research. For the data presented in chapter 7, with the exception of the 10 and 40 hour
maintenance windows MTBR data in Figure 46, the p-values for t-test comparisons
within each figure are less than 0.0001, thus statistically significant. The data for 10 and
40 hour windows can be compared in other figures, with statistical significance, to
determine which one to choose. Additionally, as each of the 100 replications run per
scenario has 12 aircraft and simulates 15 years, an immense amount of data points are
generated yielding the small confidence intervals.

Summary
This chapter illustrates the potential benefit of including a maintenance
opportunity window to allow grouping of maintenance tasks. It is shown that grouping
can improve operational availability through a reduction in total downtime. However, this
performance improvement comes at the expense of increased spares costs even while
maintenance costs decline. The maintenance window permits another factor to be
considered in performing a trade-space analysis to determine requirements for ISHM
capabilities and maintenance and logistics processes. Finally, data show that uncertainty
needs to be kept low if a lognormal distribution is used for the remaining useful life
prognostic.
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VIII. Conclusions and Recommendations

Chapter Overview
This chapter compiles conclusions from the preceding chapters and identifies the
significance of the research presented. Recommendations for action and proposed future
research efforts are also discussed.

Conclusions of Research
The main contribution of this effort is a simulation tool to compare sensing and
maintenance options and examine their impact on desired performance factors. The
ability to input ISHM system and aircraft characteristics and investigate alternative
approaches to monitoring, maintenance processes, and spares management makes this
tool useful in program decisions on whether or not to implement monitoring techniques.
Weighing the impacts of simulation outputs and management philosophies with cost and
performance objectives is left to program managers to determine the appropriate level of
service required. The ability to define a trade-space for system parameters early in the
development of an aircraft or any system affords the opportunity to explore future cost
savings and weigh performance trade-offs against defined system architectures and
component system requirements.
Conclusions from this research and answers to the research questions from
chapter 1 are as follows: Question #1 asked what the key cost and effectiveness drivers
for ISHM enabled condition based maintenance and logistics processes. The research
scenarios in chapters 4 through 7 show that prognostic accuracy is a driver of cost to
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operate with an ISHM system in that it drives false alarms and thus unnecessary
inspections and labor costs. In order to counter a set or known prognostic accuracy
setting a tolerance for the number of false alarms allowed prior to ISHM system
maintenance becomes a trade-off between cost and system availability. Further,
maintenance personnel allocation and maintenance opportunity windows impact cost and
availability and must be weighed when determining system priorities. Additionally, with
ISHM prognostics, supply ordering gains efficiency over baseline processes and with
careful contract negotiations a just-in-time logistics chain may be a viable alternative.
Finally, cost of development, acquisition, and implementation of the ISHM/CBM system
is a major driver in the deployment of a system. The model comparisons between
baseline and ISHM processes can be used to develop a trade-space analysis to determine
a cost difference between the two to be targeted as an ISHM development and
deployment budget.
Research question #2 asked: what is a reasonable and appropriate scope for model
development to establish performance requirements for ISHM sensors and prognostics,
maintenance, and logistic processes? Inclusion of inspection, maintenance, supply, and
health monitoring tasks along with flight operations provided reasonable depth in the
model. Resources and costs associated with the aforementioned tasks were easily handled
by the model as well. Scope for this research was limited mainly in the number of
components modeled. One hundred simulation runs, to gain statistical significance, took
approximately 1 hour to process on a standard dual-core PC. There are no indications that
inclusion of additional components to the model would provide any complications other
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than increased processing time, which could be mitigated with increased processing
power.
The third research question posed: what are the operational and maintenance cost
impacts of an ISHM enabled CBM system? In the components utilized the chief cost
driver is the purchase of supplies. Total costs for like size squadrons were shown to be
similar between baseline and ISHM equipped systems. The ISHM systems however had
higher operational availability and daily flying hours that would allow a squadron ISHM
equipped aircraft to operate with 2 fewer planes and still exceed the performance of the
baseline squadron. Additionally, maintenance costs are reduced through demand versus
time-driven replacements and inspections. The impact to O&M is then the ability to
remove aircraft from inventory or to expand into other roles as availability and reliability
increase.
It is suggested that the lognormal distribution may not be optimal for utilization in
determining the remaining useful life of components. While the lognormal distribution
does eliminate the potential for negative values that may occur under the left tail of the
normal distribution, its skewness under increasing standard deviation, uncertainty in this
research, likely drives too many false alarms for acceptance as a fielded system.
However, even with an elevated number of false alarms, the ISHM enabled aircraft
provided better system performance and lower maintenance costs than a baseline system.
Research question #4 asked if mean downtime was a good measure of system
performance for ISHM/CBM systems. It was shown that MDT can increase with the
implementation of health monitoring particularly with maintenance grouping. This is
contrary to DoD projections of significant reduction in MDT with the implementation of
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condition based maintenance (Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), May 2008).
However with a poor performing supply system MDT can actually increase due to an
increase in NMCS time. Therefore, depending on the scenario an increase in MDT can be
both positive and negative from a system performance perspective. This leads to the
conclusion that MDT is not always a good predictor of overall system performance.
The final research question posed the question: does maintenance grouping based
on prognostics improve operational availability, total downtime, and cost? The results
show that maintenance grouping does increase AO through a reduction in total downtime.
While maintenance costs are reduced with grouping, supply costs increase as the
maintenance window increases since more components are required due to premature
replacement and loss of useful life.

Significance of Research
The significance of this research lies in the inclusion of flying, supply, and
maintenance processes in a single model to study the effects of integrated systems health
management. Previous research focused on these aspects individually, making limiting
assumptions for those processes not of interest and leaving the interactions between
systems unexplored. Additionally, proprietary systems developed in this field are not well
published for competitive reasons leaving a gap between research and development and
deployment. The discrete event simulation presented in this research provides a tool for
new health monitoring techniques to be analyzed by inserting them into a model to
determine the effect of their accuracy and prognostics capabilities on overall system
performance.
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The tool and simulation outputs present a capability for program management to
use in determining if the long-term performance increases of the ISHM system balance
out the additional upfront cost of implementation. The data are used to determine
feasibility of solutions and trade-space for requirements development. Further,
researchers can explore the interactions of health monitoring, supply and maintenance
processes to provide more than anecdotal projections of savings. Program management
can use the tool to conduct cost-benefit analyses when considering new systems or
operating procedures.

Recommendations for Future Research
Several recommendations for future research efforts were identified during this
research effort. Further study should include exploring repairable systems and the impact
on maintenance utilization and repair versus purchase decisions. This research would add
further depth and utility to the model as well as providing increased interactions between
supply and maintenance decisions. Additionally, the inclusion of constraints on repair or
replacement order of components would add additional realism to the work. This
restriction would incur delays prior to the start of maintenance on some parts while work
is conducted on others and would impact grouping decisions and outcomes. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, remaining useful life prognostics could be improved over those
provided by the lognormal distribution. It is suggested that other RUL formulations be
studied to potentially further improve performance and cost.
A study on a fielded aircraft with proposed or deployed health monitoring systems
would provide further validation of the processes and demonstrate real-world impacts to
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decision makers. This research could also be applied to surface vehicles, ships or other
equipment with some changes to operating procedures to determine the utility on other
systems with different system interactions and constraints. Further, a cost benefit analysis
of preventive maintenance, and the associated inspections, for known failure modes could
be conducted against projected cost savings from ISHM. Finally, while this research
discussed and provided tools for trade-space analysis, it may be possible to conduct this
type of simulation as an optimization problem. Program objectives would need to be
established as well as constraints on capabilities and resource allocations.

Summary
The research presented identifies the impacts of health monitoring systems on
supply, maintenance and flight operations. Further, it creates a tool for management to
utilize in the assessment of implementing health monitoring systems on new and legacy
aircraft. As aircraft and other systems service lives are extended beyond intended design
life and amid shrinking budgets and manpower, it is necessary to assess potential
efficiencies afforded by ISHM. The results of the research demonstrate the potential to
improve system availability, reduce cost and define a trade-space for ISHM system
assessment.
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